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Introduction & Historiographical Background to the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-1955 
On September 3, 1954, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began a barrage of 
artillery fire on the island of Quemoy
1
 controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) off the 
mainland China coast near the port of Amoy. The ROC had occupied Quemoy, along 
with other offshore islands, since Jiang Jieshi’s (Chiang Kai-shek) Nationalist 
Kuomintang (KMT) government fled to Taiwan in 1949 as Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) 
and his Communist forces consolidated control over China. This attack on Quemoy 
began the first Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55. The shelling of this small island 
precipitated an international confrontation that lasted over ten months. Ten months that 
gripped the entire world in fear of a third world war and the very real possibility of an 
atomic exchange. This event led to two major pieces of legislation; the 1954 US-Taiwan 
Mutual Defense Treaty and the Formosa Resolution as well as a dangerous, under fire, 
hasty retreat by the ROC of islands north of Formosa with the help of the US Navy’s 
Seventh Fleet. The crisis came to an unexpected end with a dramatic offer of peace at an 
international conference in Bandung, Indonesia by an unlikely source. Largely forgotten 
today in the collective historical memory of Americans, this incident, in many respects, 
was the first Cuban Missile Crisis, only played out, not in thirteen days, but over the 
course of months. On one side was the nuclear-armed United States of America and on 
the other a non-nuclear PRC allied to the Soviet Union with Taiwan in the middle playing 
the role as provocateur.  
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed that in international relations 
between adversaries, the number one reason for the start of wars was miscalculation by 
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one side or the other.
2
 Yet throughout the fall of 1954 and into the summer of 1955, the 
presidential administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower made America’s position in regards 
to the offshore islands anything but clear to Mao, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), or 
the international community. Eisenhower and the National Security Council (NSC) were 
consistently caught between two opposing philosophies and political realities in its 
dealing with the crisis. International pressure from the British and hostile domestic and 
global public opinion, kept America from publicly declaring that it would defend the 
offshore islands. The administration’s fear of handing communism what was viewed as 
another Cold War victory and irrevocably damaging Nationalist troop morale on Taiwan 
kept Dulles and Eisenhower from formulating a publicly clear and unequivocal policy for 
Formosa, the Pescadores (Penghu islands) and the Nationalist-held islands. This failure 
extended a confrontation that should have ended in a matter of days or weeks for nearly a 
year.  
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
faced a quintessential cold war dilemma. Should America use military force to stand up 
to the aggression of China in an effort to thwart the threat of Communist expansion in 
Asia, a decision in keeping with the Truman and recently established Massive Retaliation 
Doctrine? On the other hand, should the US moderate its approach and use diplomacy 
and retreat to diffuse a situation in which the Eisenhower administration had few if any 
allies? Both the American people and international opinion was decidedly against a 
military intervention. Could the president give the Communists yet another perceived 
victory following on the heels of the Korean armistice and the end of French colonial rule 
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in Indochina (Vietnam)? Eisenhower and Dulles did not, in the end, take the US into a 
war with China over relatively insignificant offshore islands in the Pacific.  
The complexity of this event is legion. International territorial law, the Domino 
Theory, the winding down of Colonialism, Cold War brinksmanship, the newly 
established Doctrine of Massive Retaliation, the role of the 1954 US-Taiwan Mutual 
Defense Treaty, The Formosa Resolution, Eisenhower’s management style, and what 
constitutes a threat to US national interests are just a few of the many issues that will be 
unpacked in the course of this study. This is an endeavor to tell the entirety of the Taiwan 
Straits Crisis of 1954-5 from the US perspective with all of its nuances and intricacies. 
Historians from H.W. Brands, Xiao Bing Li, He Di, John Lewis Gaddis, and many others 
have tackled this wonderful Cold War case study, but have, for the most part, only looked 
at it from a particular vantage point, only telling a small slice of the broader story. This 
project will piece together the work of these talented historians along with new insights 
and research to produce the fullest account of this event to date.  
With the defeat of Jiang’s Nationalist forces on the mainland, the Generalissimo, 
as he was known at home and abroad, consolidated his political and military allies on the 
island of Formosa and the nearby Pescadores. In addition to this main stronghold, the 
KMT also controlled other offshore islands and groups of islands up and down the coast 
of China in the East China Sea and Taiwan Straits. Jiang controlled the large island of 
Hainan in southern China near Guangdong Province and the Zhoushan Archipelago off 
Zhejiang Province near Shanghai. However, the most important holdings for this story 
are as follows: The Quemoy group of two islands, big and little Quemoy, directly west of 
Formosa and off the coast of modern day Fujian Province in southern China; the Matsu 
 4 
islands set a little further to the north near Fuzhou still in Fujian Province; and the other 
two main island groups controlled by Nationalist forces were the Dachen (Tachen) island 
chain off Zhejiang Provence two hundred miles to the north of Formosa and various other 
island holdings just a few miles to the north of the Dachen’s that have a variety names, 




Jiang relocated his government to Taipei, Taiwan on December 8, 1949. This left 
Mao Zedong and his generals with a new and unique problem. They would have to 
employ amphibious assault tactics to finish off the Nationalists, amphibious operations 
that the PLA was inexperienced with. Throughout late 1949 and 1950, the PLA began 
prepared, and in April successfully landed, 100,000 troops on Hainan, destroying the 
equally large Nationalist forces there with ease. The Zhoushan Archipelago fell soon 
after and the PLA was making preparations for their assault on Quemoy, and ultimately 
Taiwan itself, with a planned 800,000 man landing force intended to end the Chinese 
Civil War.
4
 China had seen unending warfare since the fall of the Qing dynasty at the 
turn of the Twentieth Century. Nationalists battled warlords and Communists fought 
Nationalists in the aftermath of the fall of the Empire. The Japanese invaded in the 1930s, 
occupied much of China and fought with both Nationalist and Communist forces through 
the end of WWII when the Allies defeated Japan in 1945. After the war Jiang and Mao 
attempted to set up a power sharing government. When the warring Chinese parties failed 
to secure a peace, President Harry Truman sent General George Marshal to negotiate a 
ceasefire in early January 1946. While both parties signed, it ultimately collapsed and the 
Civil War resumed in earnest.
5
 By 1950 the constant warfare had left China scarred and 
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weary. Mao’s PLA and PRC was on the cusp of a historic victory to unify all of China for 
the first time in half a century when war broke out in Korea, putting the conquest of 
Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi and his Nationalists on hold.
6
 
The Korean War marks the point at which the US began to involve itself directly 
into the Chinese Civil War. President Harry Truman ordered elements of the US Navy’s 
Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits on June 27, 1950 only “two days after the North 
Korean invasion of South Korea.”
7
 This move was to keep the PLA and Jiang’s forces 
from engaging one another. The overall military strategy for Truman was to keep Beijing 
from capturing Taiwan, and posing a threat to US operations in Korea, as well as to 
ensure the war did not expand beyond the Korean peninsula. As a result of Truman’s 
decision, Beijing suspended military operations in the straits and focused on the new war 
in Korea, which was closer to China’s fledgling industrial base and supply routes to the 
Soviet Union and Manchuria.
8
 The Seventh Fleet, with its new orders, ensured a quiet 
period in the offshore region for the remainder of Truman’s prosecution of the Korean 
War. 
There has, to this point, never been a monograph written specifically about the 
Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55. However, the event is well covered by journal articles 
and chapters in books discussing US foreign policy, US diplomacy, the Cold War, the 
Eisenhower administration, US-China relations, military history, and a variety of other 
topics. While the Taiwan Straits Crisis is not now a major incident engrained in the 
American public’s conscience, like World War II or the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is a 
standard case study that is nearly always mentioned in major academic reference works.
9
 
Because of its ubiquity, a complete review of everything ever written about the subject is 
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not a reasonable goal of this chapter, especially considering much of the interpretation of 
the crisis will be repetitive across the major reference works. Therefore, although in 
depth, this discussion will only cover the major historians and scholarship on the subject 
to put this thesis within the context of the historiography of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 
1954-5. 
Before this examination of the scholarship can begin, however, there is one 
historian that needs to be discussed and a full explanation proffered as to why his work 
does not appear in this thesis in any form other than in the following conversation. For 
decades anything the well-known historian Stephen E. Ambrose wrote about Dwight D. 
Eisenhower was considered the standard work on the subject. Ambrose was after all the 
“official biographer” of Ike. In November 2010, Tim Rives, the deputy director of the 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, hosted a retrospective on the 
work historian Stephen E. Ambrose did with the former President. Ambrose, as most 
Eisenhower historians know, wrote the standard biography of Eisenhower as Supreme 
Allied Commander during WWII and later as president. In research done for the 
Eisenhower Presidential Library event, Rives uncovered what has since become a major 
scandal in certain historical circles. Rives consulted the official appointment calendars for 
the former president and found that Ambrose had actually only met with Eisenhower 
three times for only a few hours in total. Ambrose, for his part, cited dozens of interviews 
with the former president in his endnotes for biographies covering Eisenhower’s military 
and political career, interviews that simply did not occur.
10
 Whether the information 
Ambrose used in writing his history was gleaned from other sources and attributed to 
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non-existent interviews or if Ambrose simply produced research out of whole cloth is still 
being debated.  
The more important question for twentieth century, Cold War, and Eisenhower 
historians is what should be done with what has, for over two decades, been the standard 
works? The most academically responsible decision is to essentially trash them. For the 
purposes of this study, none of the published work of Stephen E. Ambrose has been 
consulted or will be referenced or discussed. Ambrose’s work is no longer a credible 
source for academics and should be ignored in all further research and publications. The 
task of Eisenhower and Cold War historians now is to begin again. This study is, 
hopefully, the beginning of a total re-evaluation of Eisenhower’s legacy, to dive back into 
the archives once again and produce a new, untainted, professional history of Eisenhower 
and his times. This particular thesis is not only a case study for understanding the Cold 
War but also a case study in a new historical research project on Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
There are a variety of ways to tackle the historiography of a particular event. 
Chronological, topical, and even going through the scholarship based on the importance 
of the work are all legitimate avenues to take. For this study a chronological system will 
be employed, but with two major exceptions. Thomas E. Bailey’s A Diplomatic History 
of the American People was the most important reference work on American diplomatic 
history from 1940 until well after its last updated version published in 1980. Bailey’s 
breezy wit and simple construction brought diplomatic history to the masses and is not 
just the standard work for many, but is also a classic. Because of its popularity and wide 
use, an examination of how Bailey interpreted the Taiwan Straits Crises of 1954-5 will 
begin this literature review. The second exception to the chronological format is the work 
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of historian H.W. Brands. In 1988 Brands wrote “Testing Massive Retaliation: 
Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait” for the journal International 
Security. This article was the first serious historical review of the 1954-55 crisis after the 
publication in 1985 of the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States 
covering the periods of 1952-4 and later the 1986 publication of records covering 1955-7. 
Brands’ interpretation of the crisis from this article has remained, for the most part, the 
standard view of the crises. Many larger reference works and monographs covering this 
time period will refer back to “Testing Massive Retaliation” as the major work on the 
topic. Because of the importance of Brands’ article, it will be discussed last in this 
review. From a historiographical point of view it could be argued that this thesis is as 
much an answer to the interpretation of Brands as any other historian. 
Thomas E. Bailey in A Diplomatic History of the American People, describes the 
Taiwan Straits Crisis, not so much as an event on its own, but through the prism of the 
Formosa Resolution passed by Congress on January 25, 1955. Bailey does not even use 
the words Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-5 in his narrative, instead focusing solely on the 
Formosa Resolution giving to the President the power to use America’s armed forces to 
protect the Republic of China on Taiwan from the Communist mainland government of 
the People’s Republic of China. Bailey slyly tells the reader that the Formosa Resolution 
“was so deviously worded as to authorize the President to defend Quemoy and Matsu, 
even though these islets were purposely left unmentioned.”
11
 Bailey claims the Formosa 
Resolution had a “sobering” effect on the PRC over time and contributed to a “gradually 
improved” situation.
12
 Bailey goes into very little detail on the crisis itself and views the 
US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, not in the context of the imbroglio as this study will 
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do, but only as a continuation of Dulles’s efforts to create alliances in the Pacific against 
communism.
13
 Bailey’s narrative is disjointed, jaundiced, and does not convey how 
serious the event was at the time, nor how close to war America came with China in the 
years 1954-55. 
One of the very first professional historical accounts of the 1954-55 crisis was 
done in 1956 by D.F. Fleming in his The Western Political Quarterly article “Our Brink-
of-War Diplomacy in the Formosa Strait.” Fleming’s account was hostile to the 
Eisenhower administration and clearly biased. The article reflects the author’s liberal 
political views and is in line with Fleming being considered a mid-century revisionist 
historian. The most important aspect of the work, however, is that the main narrative of 
the crisis was established by this article. Fleming called the crisis “the high point of the 
Cold War,” establishing the event as deserving of serious reporting and historical 
investigation.
14
 Fleming blamed the US military, specifically Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Arthur Radford, and Dulles for pushing Eisenhower to the brink of war. 
According to Fleming, only after Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Robert F. Carney told a 
group of reporters that he believed the PRC would attack in mid-April 1955 did the 
American people wake up to the possibility of an atomic war starting over Quemoy and 
Matsu. Once this occurred, Fleming argues that the Eisenhower administration began to 
back down from its more bellicose statements with regards to the offshore islands.
15
  
Fleming believed the Carney incident was the turning point of the crisis. Although 
current evidence places Carney’s off the record comments as a minor affair in 1955, 
Fleming is correct in his conclusion that a lack of public support in America in 
conjunction with little allied world backing acted as an anchor on the Eisenhower 
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administration’s more radical tendencies. Fleming, unfortunately, only got the story half 
correct. He astutely diagnosed why Eisenhower did not act more aggressively in the 
straits but did not ascertain why the administration was taking a hard line during the crisis 
in the first place. Fleming believed that the Republican “war party’ in Congress along 
with the military and Dulles wanted a war with Communist China and used this incident 
as a reason to eliminate a possible larger threat that China could become in the future 
once she fully industrialized and then realize its full potential in the region.
16
 There is 
only one brief mention of the Eisenhower administration’s obsession with Nationalist 
troop morale and no acknowledgement of the fear that the loss of Formosa would be the 




William M. Bueler, in U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan, had the 
opposite problem of Fleming. Bueler accurately diagnosed that the morale of the 
Nationalist troops was the principle reason why the Eisenhower administration was so 
attached to the offshore islands. Although he did not mention the Domino Theory, Bueler 
is one of the first historians to actually take Eisenhower and Dulles at their word when 
they said KMT troop morale was the most important aspect of the crisis with regards to 
the offshore islands.
18
 Unlike Fleming, however, Bueler did not attempt to explain why 
Eisenhower and Dulles refused to publicly support the offshore islands or discover why 
the administration was only willing to go so far in provoking the PRC. He never made the 
connection that domestic and foreign lack of support acted as a moderating force for the 
White House.  
 11 
Michael Schaller, in The United States and China in the Twentieth Century, is a 
good example of how the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55 is overlooked or folded into 
the 1958 crisis which often receives more attention in larger monographs on US-China 
relations such as Schaller’s work. Schaller spends only a page and a half on both crises in 
a nearly two hundred page book and described the events as only important in how US 
policy developed concerning US support for Jiang to retake the mainland.
19
 Like Bueler, 
Schaller also does not discuss the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty within the context 
of the 1954-5 crisis. 
One of the first accounts of the straits affair to use significant Eisenhower 
administration records was the work of Bennet C. Rushkoff in his article for Political 
Science Quarterly entitled "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-
1955.” Rushkoff’s main purpose in writing his article was do dissect how involved 
Eisenhower was in the formulation of policy during the crisis as opposed to the influence 
of Dulles. The first historical interpretations of the Eisenhower presidency was that the 
president allowed his Secretary of State free reign to make policy and simply rubber 
stamped decisions made in the State Department. Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s 
historians such as Richard H. Immerman and others overturned this initial perception and 
found a very involved chief executive. Rushkoff’s "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-
Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955” can be seen as a continuation of the work started by other 
Dulles and Eisenhower historians.
20
 Because it is now a settled issue that Eisenhower was 
deeply engaged in policy making and Dulles did not run rough shod over the entire 
diplomatic corps, this thesis does not discuss, in any meaningful way, the division of 
power between Dulles and Eisenhower. Historiographically, the question of who was in 
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charge in the White House during the 1950s has long been settled; Eisenhower ran the 
show.
21
   
Leonard H. D. Gordon, in “United States Opposition to Use of Force in the 
Taiwan Strait, 1954-1962,” was, like Rushkoff, one of the first historians to be able to 
utilize declassified documents from the Eisenhower administration to begin the process 
of building a more complete narrative of the 1954-55 crisis. Gordon accurately points out 
that in March 1955 the administration was actively trying to avoid a confrontation with 
the PRC because it feared upsetting treaty negotiations going on in Europe (more on this 
later in this study), however, Gordon comes to the wrong conclusions from the 
documentary evidence.
22
 Gordon claims the Eisenhower administration’s goals 
throughout the crisis was to avoid using the military. While it is true the President in the 
end avoided an armed conflict in 1955 as well as 1958, Eisenhower contemplated using 
force off and on throughout 1954 and 1955 and was only held back by a lack of domestic 
and foreign support. The true nature of the conflict was more nuanced and complicated 
than Gordon describes in his article. One of the main purposes of this thesis is to bring to 
light those very nuances and complications. 
To date, the most comprehensive sweeping historical look at the 1954-55 Taiwan 
Straits Crisis was completed in 1985 in the form of Thomas E. Stolper’s China, Taiwan, 
and the Offshore Islands: Together with an Implication for Outer Mongolia and Sino-
Soviet Relations. Despite the heavy handed secondary title, this monograph is essentially 
about the 1954-55 affair. Because Stolper deals with the 1958 crisis and a few other 
issues, perhaps to satisfy a publishers request, it would not be accurate to call this work a 
monograph simply on Quemoy-Matsu Crisis in 1954 and 1955. Stolper does a wonderful 
 13 
job of laying out the relationship between the three main parties of the US, ROC, and 
PRC. His interpretations are sound and complex, as the relationship between these 
countries were, and Stolper takes no shortcuts in his research or narrative. However, 
Stolper completed his study just before the publication of the Foreign Relations of the 
United States volumes that covered his topic. The one major source not available to 
Stolper was the National Security Council meetings in which many of the most important 
decisions of the incident were discussed and made. As a result, Stolper missed the fact 
that negotiations for the US-Taiwan MDT in late 1954 were green lit by the White House 
as a quid pro quo for Jiang’s support of action in the United Nations Security Council to 
enforce a ceasefire in the straits.  
Xiaobing Li has written extensively on the Taiwan Straits. His first monograph, 
Diplomacy Through Militancy in the Taiwan Straits: Crisis Politics in the 1950’s, is 
representative of a new addition to the historiography of the offshore islands in that it 
incorporates the use of Chinese language documents from the PRC and ROC point of 
view.
23
 The fullest expression of this new scholarship can be found in Li’s A History of 
the Modern Chinese Army, which blends Li’s interpretation of the relationship of the US 
and China with a detailed account of the history of the PLA, and for the purposes of this 
study the 1950s in particular.
24
  
Finally we must look at the work of H.W. Brands. As noted above Brands was the 
first historian to utilize the publications of the Foreign Relations of the United States in 
1985 covering the periods of 1952-54 and later the 1986 publication of records covering 
1955-1957. Brands’ interpretation of the first Taiwan Straits Crisis is that the central 
character of the event was the “New Look” policy that included Massive Retaliation as its 
 14 
main element. Brands argues that this was the first true test of that new policy and it was, 
in the end, successful. America threatened the use of atomic weapons and the PRC 
backed down.
25
 As this study will hopefully prove, the New Look had little major impact 
on how the crisis unfolded. The determination that atomic weapons would need to be 
used to protect the offshore islands is certainly dramatic and draws the eye, but the 
Domino Theory and the fear of losing Taiwan to the Communists and perhaps as a result 
all of Asia was the more important Cold War concept throughout the confrontations 






The US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty and its Impact on the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 
1954-1955 
The 1952 American presidential election ended with former WWII Supreme 
Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower becoming the thirty-fourth President of the 
United States. The virtually stalemated Korean War needed both the election of 
Eisenhower in 1952 and the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in early 1953 to truly 
pave the way for armistice talks. Eisenhower was the only credible American leader that 
could bring back to the United States a truce with less than complete victory and Stalin’s 
death removed the last strong pressure on the Chinese to keep the war going. The Korean 
War truce was signed on July 27, 1953 ending combat operations that, to this day, never 
materialized into a formal peace treaty.
26
 Eisenhower’s decision regarding the Seventh 
Fleet in the Taiwan straits, however, set the stage for confrontation between Washington 
and Beijing in the years to come. 
After Eisenhower became president, he changed the orders for the Seventh Fleet 
from keeping both sides from engaging one another, to a policy of allowing Jiang’s 
military to begin harassing operations against the mainland. According to Dulles, this 
policy shift, called “unleashing Chiang,” was intended by the president as a “diversionary 
threat” to the PRC during the Korean War.
27
 This change in the Seventh Fleet’s orders 
caused Mao and the other Communist party leaders to enact a new propaganda and 
military campaign in the offshore area following the end of the Korean War. Beijing also 
renewed its focus on Taiwan because of a failed Beijing rapprochement at the Geneva 
Conference with America in May 1953, and rumors of possible mutual defense treaty 
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talks between the US and the ROC.
28
 The 1954 US Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty 
between the US and ROC was both created by the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55 and at 
the same time partially caused and fueled of the crisis. How these two seemingly opposite 
facts are true will be discussed throughout this first chapter of our story.  
Jiang Jieshi proposed a defense treaty with America in early 1954 that Dulles and 
the Eisenhower administration considered ill-timed and too problematic for serious 
consideration. The main obstacle was the precarious status of the offshore islands.
29
 Mao 
Zedong, for his part, decided to initiate a military campaign in the coastal area partly 
because of rumored negotiations for a bilateral pact between America and Taiwan.
30
 Mao 
said China would inaugurate a crusade of “liberating Taiwan” to deal with the US and 
Taiwan issue off their coast on July 23, 1954 in a telegram to PRC Premier Zhou Enlai.
31
  
The ROC began a variety of military actions off the coast of China, with US aid, 
that included raids on Communist and international shipping bound for China and CIA 
trained ROC troop assaults on the mainland itself.
32
 The ROC even seized the Soviet ship 
Taupse between Luzon and Formosa, which caused a minor international incident on 
June 23, 1954.
33
 Because of these new ROC armed operations, the PLA came to the 
conclusion that it “could not defend the entire coast.” This fact, along with Mao’s 
“liberate Taiwan” campaign, led to General Zhang Aiping of the PLA, in command of 
forces off the Zhejiang coast, to plan an offensive combined military campaign against 
the Nationalist held Dachen islands 200 miles to the north of Taiwan and not far from 
Zhejiang Province. After gaining control of the sea and air space around the Dachen’s in 
skirmishes with ROC forces and taking the small Dongji Islands to the north of the main 
 17 




Unfortunately for General Zhang, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was 
visiting Zhejiang province in September 1954 and Mao cancelled the Dachen plans to 
avoid and international incident while Nehru was in the area. Mao did, however, allow 
heavy PLA shelling of the Nationalist held island of Quemoy off the Fujian Province 
coast and across the strait from Taiwan on September 3, 1954.
35
 The shelling of Quemoy 
on September 3 began the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55. Truman’s decision to send 
the Seventh Fleet into the straits in 1950 and Eisenhower’s decision to maintain the 
fleet’s presence after the Korean War, along with “unleashing Chiang” and the offshore 
raids, led the PRC to begin ambitious military operations that Washington came to view 
as an immediate confrontation it had to deal with. The question that faced the Eisenhower 
administration was whether to use military force or find a diplomatic solution. 
John Foster Dulles had been thinking about the PRC very early in the 
administration, largely because of Korea, but also in relation to the administration’s 
broader policies in Asia. More importantly, Dulles attempted to stamp his rules on how to 
deal with international diplomacy on the State Department, namely: no miscalculations. 
Dulles wrote to the new president that  
Communist China is now extending aid to the Indochinese Communists in 
the training and equipment of local Communist guerilla forces. There is 
the risk that, as in Korea, Communist China might send its own army into 
Indochina. The Chinese Communist regime should realize that such a 
second aggression could not occur without grave consequences which 
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might not be confined to Indochina. I say this in the interest of peace and 
in the hope of preventing another aggressor miscalculation.
36
  
The basis for this message to Eisenhower was a long developing view of why wars start 
and what nations of good will could proactively do to avoid them. On September 2, 1953 
Dulles gave a speech in which he laid out his matured vision about international conflicts. 
Dulles said that  
The Korean War began in a way in which wars often begin-a potential 
aggressor miscalculated. From that we learn a lesson which we expect to 
apply in the interest of future peace. The lesson is this: If events are likely 
which will in fact lead us to fight, let us make clear our intention in 
advance; then we shall probably not have to fight. Big wars usually come 
about by mistake not design. It is probable that the Korean War would not 
have occurred if the aggressor had known what the United States would 
do. The Communist thought, and had reason to think, that they would not 
be opposed, except by the then small and ill-equipped forces of the 
Republic of Korea. They did not expect what actually happened.
37
 
This standard of international relations should have served Dulles and Eisenhower well in 
the upcoming Taiwan Straits Crises; however, the secretary was never able to put into 
practice the architecture he eloquently laid out in 1953.  
 In addition to this new formula, Dulles and Eisenhower sought to reform how 
America would use its military to thwart Communist threats. The president adopted 
Truman’s containment policy, but decided early in his administration to drastically cut 
defense spending. With a diminished defense budget, Eisenhower would not be able to 
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call on large reserves of conventional forces to do battle with Communist forces. As a 
result, Dulles and Eisenhower came up with the “New Look” or “Massive Retaliation” 
doctrine, which would rely on America’s atomic weapons arsenal to discourage the 
Soviet Union and the PRC from either attacking the US and its allies directly or involving 
themselves in revolutionary movements in the developing world.
38
 The Taiwan Straits 
Crisis of 1954-5 occurred in the midst of these policy changes and had a small but 
important role in how the administration handled the crisis, particularly with respect to 
discussions of atomic weapons use in the offshore area. However, “Massive Retaliation” 
did not play as large a role in the decision making process of the US as the issues of ROC 
morale in relation to the “Domino Theory.” This conclusion is in opposition to much of 
the current academic interpretation of the crisis.
39
 
At the end of August 1954, before the Quemoy shelling, the issue of a defense 
treaty between the US and the ROC was raised again in conjunction with a Dulles visit to 
Southeast Asia in early September that included a stop in Taipei to meet with Jiang. The 
State Department was sure that the Generalissimo would bring up the bilateral agreement 
issue and some even began to lobby for it.
40
 In late August, Walter S. Robertson, who 
was the assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs, attempted to convince Dulles for 
a second time to approve of treaty negotiations that Dulles had scuttled in May 1954. 
Robertson reported that if a treaty could be signed, Jiang was willing to clear all offensive 
military operations against Communist China with the United States beforehand. This 
removed, according to Robertson, a thorny issue plaguing the Eisenhower administration, 
namely, the fear of Jiang dragging the US into a war with Mao America did not initiate.
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Eisenhower was determined to be the one to choose where and when the US would go to 
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war and was intent on not allowing poor decision making by any of America’s allies to 
back him into a corner. Eisenhower had already expressed, on October 23, 1953, that the 
US would not support President Syngman Rhee of South Korea if he initiated a renewed 
attack on North Korea on his own. Eisenhower told Dulles the US resolved “not to be 
involved if he should take any such extraordinary and foolish action.”
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 The Robertson 
memorandum raised treaty prospects once again, and with the addition of an issue close 
to the president’s heart, started a significant debate within the State Department.  
John D. Jernegan, the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and 
African Affairs, wrote Robertson to inform him that a defense agreement with Taiwan 
would further deteriorate America’s relationship with India, and this fact should be 
mentioned to Dulles.
43
 Obviously, India was under Jernegan’s purview and his 
responsibilities were to improve relations with India and his perspective can be 
challenged as biased. However, his objection is indicative of the struggle in the State 
Department over the treaty issue.  The State Department planning staff director warned 
Robertson that if a treaty were in the works, the Eisenhower administration would have to 
come to a definitive conclusion on the status of the Nationalist-held islands.
44
 Dulles was 
still reluctant to go forward with a treaty, stating that he believed a negotiation would 
probably have to happen in the future, but he still preferred to wait because of the 
offshore issues.
45
 Dulles met with Jiang on September 9, 1954 and the treaty came up as 
predicted.
46
 Dulles tried to make a strong argument for waiting, even stating that he felt 
Jiang was better off with the current Seventh Fleet orders rather than a defense agreement 
with all its problems concerning “phrasing” with respect to the various island positions 




The shelling of Quemoy on September 3, 1954 sent shock waves through the US 
military and diplomatic establishment. Eisenhower phoned Under Secretary of State 
Walter Bedell Smith on September 4 and in a relieved tone told his friend “We are not at 
war now.”
48
 Smith was a former general and right hand man of Eisenhower’s during 
WWII and in September 1954 undersecretary of state.
49
 Despite this sentiment, the US 
government was scrambling to evaluate and come up with a strategy to avoid or, in the 
case of many of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, start another war in Asia. In Washington on 
September 9, the National Security Council met for the first time since the September 3
 
shelling of Quemoy, only the NSC was without the two main architects of American 
foreign policy in the 1950s, Eisenhower and Dulles. Dulles was still in Asia and Ike was 
vacationing in what he called his “Summer White House” in Denver, Colorado. Vice 
President Richard Nixon chaired the NSC meeting and found a deeply divided 
government and military on how the US should respond.
50
  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur Radford spoke for the 
majority of the military when he recommended the United States use force to protect the 
offshore islands from Communist takeover. Army Joint Chief Mathew Ridgway was the 
lone dissenter among the chiefs, stating the coastal islands had no military benefit to the 
defense of Taiwan and any argument about the islands psychological benefit (more on 
this later) was not one the Joint Chiefs of Staff should evaluate.
51
 General Mathew 
Ridgway was the model soldier who had risen through the ranks with distinction in 
WWII and eventually became commander of UN forces during the Korean War after 
Truman fired General Douglas MacArthur.
52
 Ridgway’s caution with regards to sending 
American troops into harm’s way for questionable reasons extended beyond the Taiwan 
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Straits and into Indochina, where he convinced Eisenhower not to send in US soldiers to 
aid the French at Dien Bien Phu just a few months previous to the Quemoy-Matsu 
Crisis.
53
 Radford, on the other hand, had argued the exact opposite position as Ridgway 
over Dien Bien Phu. Radford advised the president, at the time, that the French in Indo-
China were about to collapse and all of Southeast Asia would surely follow. He 
recommended to the president that the US gets involved. Radford said “I consider that the 
U.S. must be prepared to act promptly and in force possibly to a frantic and belated 
request by the French for U.S. intervention.”
54
 Radford’s interventionist streak was not 
dulled by the president not taking his advice on Vietnam and was convinced once again 
that America needed to intervene militarily, only this time in the straits. Radford told 




Radford believed that no ground troops would be necessary to defend the 
Nationalist-held islands, while Ridgway said at least one division would be needed. The 
most important aspect of Radford’s assessment was that air attacks on the mainland 
would probably be necessary in the defense of the Dachen’s and definitely needed in 
defending Quemoy and the other main island controlled by Jiang, Matsu. This military 
estimate would later prove a decisive element for Eisenhower in his determination of how 
to proceed during the crisis, especially the JCS’s conclusion that atomic weapons may 
need to be used. Radford argued a major air strike against PLA airfields and gun 
emplacements was the only way to insure the safety of the islands. If the administration 
ultimately decided to limit military action against the mainland, Radford said his 
recommendation would change and his new advice would be not to defend. He made it 
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clear that the chiefs, including Ridgway, did not want a repeat of the limited war imposed 
on the military during the Korean War.
56
 Ridgway echoed that statement by saying the 
US should not get into a situation in which the Communists had a safe haven for PLA air 
that the US could not attack. Ridgway further stated that if the military were not given the 
right, at the command level, to attack the mainland they would recommend not defending 
the offshore islands.
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 Ridgway had conformed to both Truman and Eisenhower’s policy 
of not expanding the Korean War in the wake of MacArthur’s firing, but it is clear the 
general had no intention to fight another Korean style conflict. 
Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson contradicted Radford’s assessment on the 
need for ground troops when he said the US should not get into this without recognizing 
that all branches of the military would be involved. He also commented that it would be 
difficult to explain to the public why the US was going to war on mainland China over 
these small islands, when we did not over Korea or Vietnam. Acting Secretary of State 
Bedell Smith had been in contact with Dulles during his Asia trip, and at this point in the 
meeting summarized Dulles’s views by saying the US should defend the islands despite 
their dubious military value as long as they were in fact defensible and the administration 
cleared its action through Congress. If America could not defend them, Smith continued, 
then the US would find itself in “another Dien Bien Phu.”
58
 It is important to note that 
these were the initial conclusions of Dulles without the benefit of face-to-face 
consultation with his staff or, for that matter, the president. Dulles never seemed too 
comfortable with the direction the crisis was taking him and Eisenhower and this can be 
seen by his stipulation that a fractious Congress would have to be consulted and a 
guarantee that the islands could be secured. Dulles was throwing a bone to the hawks by 
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saying the islands should be defended, not wanting to alienate the majority of the Joint 
Chiefs, but it should come as no surprise that a few days later the tone and policy 
prescriptions of Dulles change dramatically during an equally dramatic NSC meeting in 
Denver on September 12. 
Fundamentally, Admiral Radford believed that if Jiang lost the offshore islands, 
then the morale of his troops would fall to the point of an easy takeover of Formosa by 
the PLA, and this would then jeopardize the entire American position in the Far East.
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The military significance of the various coastal islands became a running debate within 
the administration throughout the crisis, however, the issue of Nationalist troop morale 
and the psychological impact of the loss of the offshore islands, became the obsession of 
the executive branch and the argument of first and last resort against all those who 
opposed American bluster (if not actual action) in the Taiwan Straits. One cannot 
overstate the messianic hold the question of ROC troop morale had on Eisenhower and 
Dulles during this period. While there are a variety of reasons why the crisis persisted for 
such a long period of time, only this issue is mentioned by Eisenhower and Dulles, ad 
nauseam, from the beginning of the crisis to the end. The morale issue continuously held 
the administration, particularly Eisenhower, back from making a more realistic appraisal 
of the confrontation with China.  
The Taiwan Straits Crisis was not the birthplace of Eisenhower’s preoccupation 
with morale. As early as 1953 the president outlined how allied self-confidence in the 
context of the Cold War was an important issue. The president believed that the spirit of 
underdeveloped allies in the Cold War was of major concern and the US should place 
troops and bases there for the morale of these countries until they could begin to 
 25 
contribute significantly to their defense against communism. However, the president 
made clear that the US could not arm a Roman wall against communism on their own and 
would not garrison Europe forever.
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The only significant push back against the importance of the morale of Jiang’s 
troops came during this meeting from an unlikely source. John Foster Dulles’s brother, 
Allen Dulles, served as director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1953-61. During 
this initial NSC meeting over the Quemoy shelling, Nixon asked the CIA head what the 
ramifications for the US and the ROC would be if the administration decided not to 
intervene. Allen Dulles responded by saying the prestige of the US would be diminished, 
but suffer less if the coastal islands were voluntarily evacuated versus being overrun. As 
for Mao and the PRC, Dulles concluded that they would obviously gain in stature. Allen 
Dulles continued by saying that, “he did not believe that over the long run the loss of the 
offshore islands would have a very grave impact on the morale of the Chinese Nationalist 
government and the forces on Formosa.” Radford, as one would expect, vehemently 
disagreed with Allen Dulles’s last point saying that Jiang would not be convinced to 
evacuate and even if the US could, “the result might be a revolt and the loss of control of 
Formosa. Formosa might even go over to the Communists. We must consider our course 
of action in the light of our total strategic position in the Far East.”
61
  
Radford argued against the idea that the Nationalist-held islands were not of any 
value as well. Bedell Smith remarked that in the past, there had been no serious 
consideration to defend the islands. Smith’s ideas were especially convincing because it 
was coming from the man who had studied the issue previously as the predecessor to 
Allen Dulles at the CIA. Radford responded by trying to make it clear that there were 
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reasons to hold on to the islands, for example as a place to invade the mainland in the 
future. The Admiral had also earlier in the meeting argued that the offshore islands may 
not be necessary for the defense of Formosa itself, but were important from a “strictly 
military point of view.” Radford also opposed seeking Congressional approval, stating 
that it would take too much time and the offshore islands needed to be protected 
immediately and that this protection almost had to be automatic.
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 Despite the rigorous 
debate, no consensus was reached on September 9, but the transcripts and stories of the 
heated meeting surely reached Eisenhower in Denver and the president would be the one 
that would ultimately decide whether to follow Radford into a war on mainland China or 
forge a different course with the help of his Secretary of State who was, himself, on his 
way home from Asia. 
With Dulles back in the United States, Eisenhower called for a national security 
meeting at Lowry Air Force Base in Denver, Colorado on September 12, 1954, nine days 
after the Quemoy shelling.
63
 The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Dulles’s trip to 
Asia and decide on an official position for the government on the offshore islands based 
on Radford’s recommendations, the views of the other council members, and most 
importantly the views of the president himself.
64
 The reason for the Dulles visit to Asia, 
which coincided with the outbreak of the crisis, was to negotiate a new international 
organization to combat communism.  
The name of this organization was the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization or 
SEATO. Although SEATO sounded like an eastern equivalent to NATO, Dulles and 
Eisenhower saw it distinctly different in form if not function. SEATO was born out of 
Dulles’s failed attempt to create a similar organization he called United Action before the 
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Geneva Peace conference in the spring and summer of 1954, which decided the fate of 
the Korean War and the Indochina affair between the French colonial forces and Ho Chi 
Minh’s Communist Viet Minh. The countries included in this new organization would 
have been Australia, New Zealand, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, 
Thailand, Philippines, and Indochina. Dulles initially opposed the name of SEATO, 
because of its allusions to NATO that would inevitably occur, and because Dulles saw 
SEATO more in the vein of the Organization of American States (OAS), which was a 
deliberative consulting organization that did not have specific troop obligations for 
member nations.
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 Dulles further saw SEATO as an extension of the “Monroe Doctrine 
formula previously used in the Anzus and Philippine treaties.”
66
 Aside from the western 
countries involved, the other Asian allied nations were not in an advantageous economic 
or military position to contribute a significant military force to a NATO style 
organization. It was this plan that Dulles was finalizing in Manila when the shells began 
falling on Quemoy on September 3, 1954.
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 The extent to which Mao was feeling 
pressure by a new containment type organization attempting to surround and strangle 
China is one that has not been delved into in any great detail as of yet in the scholarship. 
This study is focused on the American perspective and will not attempt to ascertain how 
this affected Mao’s decision making in the straits, however, SEATO is important to how 
the US eventually looked at the US-Taiwan MDT in its broader context of the Cold War 
and the American policy of containment in Asia. Dulles added, in a “separate protocol, 
Cambodia, Laos, and the free areas of Vietnam were also included in the treaty area.”
68
  
The Denver NSC meeting began with Dulles reporting on the success of the 
SEATO talks. The discussions were fraught with divisions and compromise. Dulles 
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disclosed that the biggest controversy was over who the target of the treaty should be. 
Dulles wanted it to be communism, while the majority of the other signees wanted it to 
be aggression from any quarter. Dulles, in the end, told the new SEATO member’s that 
only Communist attacks would allow for US intervention. Although this position seems 
to be somewhat dogmatic within the context of the Cold War, Dulles had good reason not 
to accept a broader definition of what actions would bring the treaty into effect. Dulles 
was afraid that border disputes in the region, which did not concern US national interest, 
could drag America into a war. The example he cited was a confrontation between India 
and Pakistan, since Pakistan was a signatory and India was most decidedly not.
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 Like 
Rhee in South Korea or Jiang on Taiwan, the US was not going to be forced into war by 
allies when American interests were not involved. SEATO was never a strong 
organization and did not represent a lasting Cold War organization, only surviving into 
the mid-seventies. However, it does show both Dulles’s and Eisenhower’s focus on the 
Pacific region as artillery fire directed on Quemoy began. 
The secretary of state continued his Asia briefing by discussing his talks in Taipei 
with Jiang Jieshi. Jiang made his expected plea for a defense treaty with the US, arguing 
that America had concluded varying types of pacts “with all of the other free nations in 
the area.” Jiang understood Washington’s reticence out of a fear that Taiwan would drag 
the US into a war with the mainland, but he argued that his government not only did not 
want direct US help in retaking all of China but that it could even be a detriment to 
winning the hearts and minds of Asia if America led with its military. Jiang also made his 
case by stating that he was doing everything he could to clear any ROC action with the 
US beforehand and that they had even postponed a response to the Quemoy shelling for 
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four days waiting for American guidance. Admiral Radford at this point in Dulles’s 
retelling said he doubted that Jiang’s last claim was true.
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Dulles made the argument that Jiang was better off under the president’s Seventh 
Fleet orders born out of the Korean War. Dulles told Jiang that Eisenhower would have 
greater flexibility under these directives than a specific defense treaty. The secretary was 
meeting with Jiang just a few days after the attacks on Quemoy, and it is surprising that 
the shelling did not figure heavily in the discussions. Dulles believed that Jiang held back 
out of fear that if he brought the issue up, the US might refuse a specific plea for help.
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When the NSC meeting turned to the most pressing issue, the coastal islands, 
Radford began his argument for protecting the positions after Allen Dulles gave a brief 
presentation on the crisis. Radford said “that the importance of the offshore islands to the 
defense of Formosa cannot be overemphasized, but he could not say that they were 
essential, although the loss of these islands would make the defense more difficult.” 
Dulles wanted to know whether Quemoy et al was “substantially related” to the defense 
of Taiwan, because he was worried that if they were not, then the president was on shaky 
ground constitutionally if he chose to act. Eisenhower and the attorney general both said 
this was a close call. Secretary of Defense Wilson clarified the arguments by saying that 
the offshore islands could not be defended without US help and intervention would 
require America to bomb the mainland. Wilson declared “the choice was between the loss 
of morale from the resulting loss of the islands, and the danger of precipitating war with 
Communist China.” Eisenhower added, “this was not just a danger but would constitute 




One of the major arguments against the protection of Quemoy, Matsu, and the 
Dachen’s was that under international law, they really did belong to the mainland. Wilson 
summed up this belief by saying that he saw “a difference between the position regarding 
Formosa and the Pescadores, which were formerly Japanese, and the offshore islands, 
which are involved in finishing up the civil war in China.” According to Wilson the 
United States should stop “supporting Chiang in stirring up hell with Communist China.” 
Beyond the legal question of which island really belonged to who, Wilson’s main 
objection to Radford’s position was that it would start a war with China. Wilson believed 
“the Communist Chinese could accept substantial attrition of their forces and therefore 
force us to expand the war” and that “we should know how we could end such a war 
before we started it.”
73
 The idea of America starting a war was one that weighed heavily 
on Eisenhower and is one explanation for why he made the decision he did during this 
dramatic crisis meeting on an air force base in Denver. 
The president was not swayed by any arguments, at least at this point in the crisis, 
that placed Quemoy as the lynch pin of Formosan security. He wondered aloud if the 
Nationalists could hold the offshore islands, which he doubted whether “the defense of 
Formosa would be considered drastically different from what it is today.” However, 
Eisenhower pointed out that the morale and psychological aspects of the offshore islands 
were important and it was right that the council had brought up the issue and proceeded 
to argued the different merits of the case. Radford continued to contend that Quemoy had 
military value despite the president’s seeming final word on the issue. Radford reiterated 
that the offshore islands were important for disrupting PRC communication in the region 
and Quemoy was the perfect staging point for an invasion of the mainland. Radford made 
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the point, from a moral and American responsibility point of view, that the US had 
encouraged the ROC to occupy these areas, had funded and supplied these forces, and 
that American personnel were, at that moment, on the ground on these islands.
74
 
One aspect of this extraordinary meeting is that it largely turned into a debate 
between Eisenhower and Radford. Both men traded blows, counterpoint to counterpoint. 
Eisenhower did not like the idea of having to put American prestige on the line in every 
corner of the world and staying indefinitely to defend the position. The president feared 
that the offshore islands would tie down American forces in the region and after seeing 
how the US responded to this particular crisis, the Communists would then use this tactic 
all over the world. He wanted the freedom to decide where and when American interests 
were truly at stake, again echoing the SEATO decisions on border disputes and insulating 
the administration from poor decision making by Rhee, Jiang, or any other US ally. 
Eisenhower would decide if America was going to go to war. Radford countered 
Eisenhower’s assessment by articulating his view that the military did not envision a 
scenario in which the armed forces would be tied down over the Quemoy issue. Radford, 
ever the navy man, said that America’s mobile forces, in the form of carriers, would be 
leading any defense and could nimbly move and react to any situation in the Pacific, even 
a renewed attack on the Korean peninsula.
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The president, after listening to Radford, clarified for all those present that what 
they were talking about was war. Eisenhower stated that if they went ahead with this plan 
he would be in danger of impeachment proceedings by the Congress. The president 
reiterated that they had no constitutional authority to act and they would have to go 
before Congress and get approval. Under no circumstances would the president act unless 
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it was constitutionally mandated.
76
 One of the lingering constitutional questions coming 
out of the Korean War was with regards to presidential authority and how and when did 
the executive have the right to engage the military in combat operations. The Republican 
Party criticized Harry Truman mercilessly for not getting Congressional approval for the 
Korean War and Eisenhower himself pledged when nominated that “We charge that they 
[the Truman administration] have plunged us into a war with Korea without the consent 
of our citizens through their authorized representatives in Congress and have carried on 
that war without will to victory.”
77
  This apparent public pledge to seek Congressional 
approval before ordering combat operations by candidate Eisenhower would become 
much more important in 1955 with the creation of the Formosa Resolution. The president 
also contended that with regards to the present situation, that if a war were coming he 
would rather fight it against the Soviets than the Chinese.
78
 Fundamentally, Eisenhower 
made it clear he was not prepared to go to war over these small offshore ROC positions.
79
  
With a gridlocked Security Council, Dulles stepped in and “expressed the hope 
that the Council would never have to make a more difficult decision.” Dulles restated the 
arguments of both sides saying on one hand if the US backed down it could endanger 
American positions throughout Asia but, on the other hand, if the US went to the defense 
of the islands it “would involve us in war with Communist China. Outside of Rhee and 
Chiang, the rest of the world would condemn us, as well as a substantial part of the U.S. 
people. The British fear atomic war and would not consider the reasons for our action to 
be justified. Possibly very few Americans would agree.”
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 Dulles decided to offer a third 
path that he had been thinking about since the end of his Asia trip that secured SEATO. 
He proposed taking the islands issue to the United Nations since the president had 
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overruled a strong military defense of Quemoy and other Nationalist holdings outside of 
Formosa and the Pescadores.
81
 Eisenhower consented to moving forward with Dulles’s 
plan. With the UN suggestion, the president had decided on a diplomatic course of action 
that he further backed up by saying the American people would not support another 
war.
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 Eisenhower laid down in this meeting the benchmark for action in the Taiwan 
Straits for the remainder of the crisis when he told the Security Council that “we must 
enlist world support and the approval of the American people.”
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 Without domestic and 
international backing, Eisenhower would not give any orders that would likely start a war 
with China. This determination acted as a an anchor keeping the administration from bold 
military action, and consequently forming the rock in the rock and a hard place America 
found itself with regards to the offshore islands. 
With the understanding that the US was going to use the UN, both Dulles and 
Special Assistant to the President, Robert Cutler, recommended to Eisenhower that the 
policy of “unleashing Chiang” be ended and America cease its support and 
encouragement of ROC raids on Mainland China.
84
 This move ended an Eisenhower 
administration practice, which had fueled the beginning of the crisis in the first place, too 
late to have a measurable impact on the international stage.  On September 17, 1954, 
Dulles met with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and enlisted his support for a 
UN resolution to be placed before the Security Council. Eden was skeptical at first, 
especially concerning the issue of the offshore islands like Quemoy. He understood and 
supported the protection of Formosa but Dulles needed several days to convince the 
United Kingdom of the logic of his plan.
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 Eden suggested that New Zealand, which at 
that time was on the Security Council as a rotating member, be the nation to bring a 
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resolution on the offshore islands forward.
86
 With the United States and Great Britain 
pulling the strings, New Zealand became the neutral arbiter in the UN for a resolution 
that was code named Oracle.
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 The British Cabinet, just before the Dulles meeting, had 
already determined that they could not support a war over Quemoy and hoped that they 
could impress upon the Americans the idea of neutralizing the offshore islands over time 




These events occurred in the midst of a mid-term election in the US. The myth of 
presidential administration’s not paying attention to domestic politics and elections 
during an international crisis is a persistent one, and often argued most profusely by 
presidents and State Departments. However, the myth is just that, and Dulles and 
Eisenhower were no different. At the end of September, Dulles wrote to Eisenhower 
telling him that Eden had spoken with the New Zealand representative and they were 
advising the US that they should move quickly before leaks to the press could damage the 
initiative. Dulles was concerned about the effects this would have on the upcoming US 
election. He advised the president that they should fast track UN action because if they 
waited it might lose some “of its persuasiveness and genuineness if we should delay 
another month.” He believed that in the end, it could have a good effect on the election 
but he would meet with Nixon to get his opinion and report back to Eisenhower.
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Although Vice President Nixon was on the Eisenhower administration’s National 
Security Council, and even chaired it in the absence of Eisenhower and Dulles, Nixon’s 
role during this crisis was largely as a political advisor whose job was to give the 
president an idea of how national security issues would play on Capitol Hill. Hence, 
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Dulles’s meeting with Nixon to gauge how house members and senators would react to a 
UN proposal in the middle of their campaigns. The UN decision had far reaching 
consequences for US-Taiwan relations and the possibility of a mutual defense treaty. 
Although Dulles expressed doubts as to whether Oracle would actually produce 
results in the UN, he felt it was at least a good public relations move to build support for 
the United States in the court of world opinion.
90
 The real problem was gauging, and 
hopefully gaining, Jiang’s support for the resolution.  The American argument to Jiang in 
favor of the UN was that the Security Council action represented the best way for Taiwan 
to maintain control of the offshore islands. This was especially true if the United States 
decided not to “intervene decisively in their defense.”
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 On October 5, 1954, the US 
Ambassador to the ROC, Karl Rankin, reported back to Washington that Jiang would not 
look favorably on Oracle. As a result of this determination, Rankin suggested that Dulles 
go forward with negotiations on a mutual defense treaty to smooth the way for the UN 
Security Council resolution.
92
 Jiang was opposed to Oracle and feared that it would lead 
to the admittance of the PRC into the UN. He even asked the United States to oppose the 
measure in the UN Security Council, obviously never having been told that the originator 
of the plan was his closest ally.
93
 The PRC and ROC were certain to be hostile to Oracle 
because it attacked both countries’ desires in the straits. For Communist China the UN 
proposal would internationalize what it viewed as an internal affair and reject that they 
had a claim to Formosa. For the Nationalist’s, the UN Security Council measure would 
deny them their right to regain the mainland through armed action. For both sides the 
New Zealand proposal would freeze the current situation and establish a long term status 




The next day, Dulles took Rankin’s advice and recommended to the National 
Security Council that the administration pursue talks with Taiwan on a bilateral defense 
agreement.
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 Two days later on October 7, Eisenhower signed off on treaty negotiations 
with the caveat that Jiang would have to “assume a defensive posture” in the straights.
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If Jiang would give such an assurance, the only other issue of contention was the case of 
Quemoy, Matsu, and the Dachens.  As noted above, the president in Denver, on 
September 12, had decided not to use the American military to secure those islands.  As a 
result, Dulles knew that the islands could not be included in the treaty. 
 Before negotiations could begin, however, Dulles needed to convince Jiang not to 
oppose Oracle. Dulles telegrammed Jiang and told him that UN action would aid in 
deterring the PRC from attacking the offshore islands and expose the PRC and USSR as 
warlike nations. Dulles told Jiang that the US would support the measure. Then Dulles 
introduced the sweetener by saying, “We are in principle prepared to make with you a 
defensive security treaty along the lines which you discussed with me.” Dulles advised 
Jiang that they had to wait to make an announcement until they could consult with 
Congress, and after the elections. Oracle, on the other hand, needed to go forward quickly 
because of the imminent threat to the offshore islands, and then Dulles had US officials 
read the language of the UN resolution to Jiang.
97
 Jiang was certainly happy to begin 
negotiations on a MDT; however, bringing him around to support Oracle was a longer 
process for the Eisenhower administration. 
 The news that the US was entering into negotiations with the ROC for a bilateral 
defense treaty was not welcome in London. Eden reported to the Cabinet that 
“disconcerting developments” were occurring with regards to Oracle and “it was 
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unfortunate that the United States Government had not warned us earlier of this 
possibility.”
98
 Eden believed that the US had planned a treaty negotiations element to its 
strategy all along and expressed indignation that his government was left out of the loop. 
However, Eisenhower and Dulles’s response to the crisis was ad hoc at best and the 
development of treaty negotiations was clearly driven by the decision to take the crisis to 
the United Nations in the first place and not a preconceived master plan. Despite 
believing they were the victims of a double cross, Eden and the Cabinet had good reason 
to be skeptical, and demanded that the offshore islands not appear in the new pact and 
some restrictions on ROC mainland raids should be included in the MDT. Eden was also 
instructed to tell Washington that Oracle could not go forward until these questions had 
been satisfactorily answered, especially with regards to Quemoy.
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The main problem with a bilateral defense agreement between the US and ROC 
had always been the offshore islands. The solution that Dulles came up with was to 
include language in the treaty that neither increased American commitments to the area 
nor reduced those responsibilities.
100
 This was a delicate balancing act in which no one 
knew what the ultimate consequences would be. Dulles made clear in the first formal 
negotiating meeting with Taiwan that the United States would need “a fairly close 
definition of the mutual defense area” if the treaty was to make it through the US Senate 
ratification process.
101
 Dulles conveniently left out of the discussion the president’s 
decision in Denver not to use force to defend the offshore positions. This desire to keep 
Quemoy and other islands out of the agreement would later lead to language in article VI 
of the treaty, stating that the defensive area would include Taiwan and the Pescadores and 




The overall purpose and reasoning for this language was multilayered.  The US 
position on the matter was that the function of the treaty, and the language that included 
the line “such other territory,” would keep the PRC guessing as to American intentions 
and not encourage them to take the offshore positions. In addition, the Eisenhower 
administration did not believe the treaty would receive Senate ratification if they 
specified Quemoy, Matsu and the Dachen’s in the agreement.
103
 Dulles went further with 
this line of thought, stating that the language in the treaty needed to be “fuzzed up” in 
relation to an American response to a PLA attack on the offshore islands. Dulles wanted 
to keep Beijing guessing as to a probable American counter attack. Dulles intended to 
create a situation in which Eisenhower could react militarily to a PLA attack on an 
offshore island, only, if he believed it was a prelude to a more aggressive move against 
Formosa itself, maximizing Eisenhower’s ability to manage the crisis.
104
 The precarious 
nature of the offshore islands and American unwillingness to commit to their defense, 
caused Dulles to go against his basic guiding principle of making international 
obligations and ‘red lines’ clear to your enemy lest he miscalculate and cause a war.  
On November 1,
 
1954 the ROC air force attacked the Chinese mainland without 
American clearance.
105
 As a result of this action, Dulles proposed a protocol to the treaty 
in an attempt at formalizing the private agreement that Taiwan would consult with the US 
before conducting offensive actions. Dulles wanted it made clear that America would not 
have treaty obligations forced on it by unauthorized Taiwanese attacks on mainland 
China.
106
 The ROC Foreign Minister George Yeh, representing Taiwan in the 
deliberations along with Ambassador to the US Wellington Koo, objected strenuously to 
the inclusion of this protocol within the text of the treaty, and this became a major point 
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of contention throughout the negotiating process.
107
 Although Yeh and Koo objected to 
Dulles’ proposed covenant, they attempted to trade its inclusion in the treaty for an 
American promise to drop Oracle. Robertson, who was lead negotiator for the US during 
many of the meetings, flatly turned down this proposal. Eventually Dulles consented to 
his protocol being initiated in the form of an exchange of notes between Taipei and 




Although the decision was made to go forward with treaty negotiations, not all on 
the national security team were in favor of a bilateral agreement.  Radford and most of 
the joint chiefs were opposed to the idea and expressed some annoyance that a full 
hearing of their views was not requested before the decision was made. Eisenhower 
dismissed Radford’s complaint stating that it only made sense to conclude a treaty 
enumerating the policy of the United States to protect Taiwan.
109
 Later, Radford warned 
Dulles that if the offshore islands were kept out of the treaty, the Admiral believed they 
would eventually fall to the Communists.
110
 Despite this warning, and obvious hostility to 
the whole idea, the die was cast and the United States would have a defense treaty with 
Taiwan. 
In mid-October 1954, Dulles outlined where the administration’s policy was with 
regards to Asia, and China in particular. Dulles said, “Our basic policy is to be clear and 
strong in our resolve to defend vital United States interest, but not to be provocative of 
war. We want peace so long as this does not involve the sacrifice of our vital interests or 
fundamental moral principles.” In support of this policy, the US had concluded treaties in 
the area and ordered the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa and taken control of the 
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Ryukyu Islands. America’s policy in the Pacific was to keep US defenses far from the US 
coast. The Korean War was ended to prevent an all-out war with the PRC and possibly 
the USSR. Dulles continued by saying that on the Korean peninsula America’s major 
concern was to keep Rhee from restarting the war. In Vietnam, Dulles summed up 
America’s position by saying that “the Executive was ready to recommend to the nation 
that we intervene in the Indochina fighting on condition that the objective would be 
independence and not colonialism, and if the action would be united action, including 
those most directly concerned in the area. When these conditions were not obtainable, we 
acquiesced perforce in the Indochina armistice and we stated that we would not seek, by 
force, to violate the armistice. We are, however, seeking to limit the ill results of the 
armistice as they may affect us, notably by the Manila Pact.”
111
  
Dulles continued by saying American policy with regards to China was to 
recognize the Nationalists as the government of China. America would give aid to the 
ROC for its economy and military, and continue its position of non-recognition of the 
PRC, oppose the UN seating of Communist China, and maintain a trade embargo on the 
mainland. In the past the administration had relied “on Executive Order for defense of 
Formosa and the Pescadores by United States Armed Forces” and also “Encouragement 
of Chinats’ harassing operations by sea and air against Communist shipping and certain 
mainland targets of opportunity. (This policy is partially and provisionally in suspense.)” 
America had, in the past, left the offshore islands issue to the PRC and ROC to fight it 
out with the US supporting the ROC materially.
112
  
Dulles said that the above policies were put in place during the Korean War and 
later during the Indochina fighting. All of these decisions were made under the “War 
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powers” provisions of the US Constitution. Dulles told Eisenhower that some changes 
were needed since the shelling of Quemoy on September 3, 1954. A mutual defense 
treaty with the ROC should go forward without including the offshore islands. Echoing 
the legal debate over Formosa versus the offshore islands, Dulles argued that Japan had 
never ceded sovereignty of Formosa to China. Japan had renounced its control, but did 
not proscribe who would get it. The US, as WWII victor, then claimed an “unsatisfied 
interest” in Formosa and the MDT should now replace Seventh Fleet orders, which were 
becoming constitutionally “questionable.” The new treaty should be defensive, and the 
ROC could not continue to attack the mainland and then turn around and claim a 
“privileged sanctuary” on Taiwan.
113
  
This new position was in line with US policy with regards to Germany and Korea 
as well, where a military settlement of reunification had been renounced. However, 
Dulles continued, if internal PRC opportunities presented themselves to the US and ROC, 
they should obviously take advantage of any weakness in Communist control of the 
Chinese mainland. Furthermore, Dulles said that the UN should step in and stop the 
fighting over the offshore islands and restore the status quo. The long-term solution 
would need to be peacefully resolved sometime in the future. If a resolution was vetoed 
in the UN Security Council, then the US could argue that Formosa be given the material 
support to defend the offshore islands. Dulles argued that the PRC was more aggressive 
towards the US than the USSR and this would justify a harsher embargo as well. If the 





As the negotiations were completed on the Mutual Defense Treaty, and with the 
offshore issue and exchange of notes agreed to, the treaty was ready for initialing, 
signing, and eventual ratification by the Senate.  Dulles initialed the treaty with Yeh on 
November 23, 1954.
115
 Eisenhower and Dulles saw the treaty in the broader context of 
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense treaty signed September 8, 1954, and as “another 
link in the chain of collective defense arrangements in the West Pacific.” The overall 
purpose of the agreement was to deter aggressive actions by communism in the treaty 
area.
116
 Dulles tried to make it clear that the treaty neither “promoted nor demoted” the 
offshore islands and he asserted that the bilateral agreement would deter Beijing from 
engaging in “probing” operations in the straits.
117
 London was not nearly as optimistic 
about the MDT. The British believed that Oracle was dead and expressed in closed door 
meetings that the New Zealand government were “as unhappy as we.”
118
 Eden claimed 
that the US-ROC treaty “might well have the effect of increasing international tension in 
the Far East.”
119
 Unfortunately, the British foreign secretary was more prescient than 
anyone in Washington could possibly realize. 
Now it was Mao Zedong who had a decision to make. His ideological enemy, the 
US, had signed a defense treaty with his domestic civil war enemy, the ROC. The 
agreement, however, was vague on what the US would do if the PRC gave the go ahead 
for the PLA to renew its military operations against the Nationalist held islands 
throughout the South China Sea. Would the US go to war? Would the US back down? 
America was certainly, from Mao’s perspective, not making a lot of sense. Mao’s 
decision came on January 18, 1955 when he allowed the head of the PLA, Peng Dehuai, 
to authorize General Zhang to go ahead with his campaign against the Dachen’s, a 
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campaign that had been cancelled in September 1954 because of Nehru’s China visit. 




With the People’s Republic of China’s ‘Liberate Taiwan’ campaign, the decision 
to shell Quemoy, and the resumption of the Dachen campaign, Mao Zedong ensured that 
a defense treaty was negotiated and signed by the United States and the Nationalist 
Republic of China.  John Foster Dulles, in reaction to the Peoples Liberation Army’s 
aggressive actions, decided to take the offshore issue to the United Nations after the 
president had refused to use American military power to secure the offshore islands, 
which in turn forced him to go forward with a defense treaty with Jiang Jieshi to secure 
his support of Oracle.  Neither Dulles nor Mao wanted a defense treaty at the beginning 
of 1954, but events conspired to make the treaty a reality.  
By the end of 1954, the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty was paradoxically one 
of the causes of and also the result of the Taiwan Straits Crisis begun on September 3. 
Both the PRC and the US had danced the dangerous game of brinksmanship to gain an 
edge over the other, and by the beginning of 1955, it was Jiang that had achieved his goal 
of a bilateral pact.  Whether Jiang intentionally set out to accomplish this from the 
beginning is difficult to discern, but the outcome gave Taiwan the security Jiang relished, 
all in the hope of making a return to the mainland one day in the future. Dulles’s decision 
to ‘fuzz up’ American intentions with regards to the offshore islands backfired 
spectacularly once the MDT was signed and moved the crisis into a more dangerous 
period. The treaty had the exact opposite effect the Eisenhower administration had 
intended and only deepened the Taiwan Straits Crisis, extending it into the new year. 
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Eisenhower had made the decision not to go to war in Denver on September 12, 1954; 




Aftermath: Eisenhower and Dulles Reevaluate a Failing Strategy 
The United States and Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty attempted to 
deter Communists from aggressive actions in the offshore area. President Eisenhower 
asserted that the deal complemented the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty of 
September 8, 1954. Secretary Dulles put the arrangement in the context of a series of 
security alliances in the West Pacific designed to thwart Communist expansion.
121
 The 
new bilateral accord only specified Taiwan and the Pescadores for the Republic of China; 
however, the language of the covenant did include reference to “such other territories” 
that fell under the contracts’ protection if “by mutual agreement.”
122
 The joint statements 
of Washington and Taipei, announcing the treaty’s signing, left the offshore islands’ 
status in a state of ambiguity as to their defense. During the press conference announcing 




The test of this new deal came on January 10, 1955, when 200 PLA aircraft 
attacked the Nationalist held Dachen islands 200 miles north of Formosa.
124
 Republic of 
China Ambassador to the United States Wellington V. Koo called the air assault a larger 
attack than any conducted by PRC forces during the entirety of the Korean War.
125
 The 
initial reaction by Eisenhower, Dulles, and Radford to the PLA attack on Yijiangshan 
was to abandon the Denver meeting determination not to defend Quemoy and Matsu. 
They believed that the PLA’s Dachen campaign had radically changed the reality on the 
ground with regards to the straits crisis. However, all of the old problems with regard to 
the offshore islands eventually resurfaced. Eisenhower and Dulles, despite their 
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immediate, visceral, response to the MDT failing to deter the PRC, were unable to make 
a public declaration of full US military support for Quemoy and Matsu because they still 
lacked the necessary international and domestic support as well as a new concern over 
how US action in Asia would affect Europe.  
Koo quickly asked what “moral and material support” his country could expect 
from the US as a result of the Yijiangshan raid, adding he did not expect direct American 
military involvement at that time. The ambassador commented that United States 
response in this matter would inform Generalissimo Jiang whether a complete defense of 
the Dachen’s should take place. Knowing his allies minds, Koo admitted the Dachen’s 
had dubious military value, but argued that the islands had strong psychological value 
and that their loss would cause great distress back on Taiwan.
126
  
Dulles and the president were shocked at the play for the Dachen’s and concluded 
that the defense treaty was not enough to solve the crisis in the straits.
127
 On January 19, 
1955, Dulles, Eisenhower, and Radford decided the time had come, as a result of the 
Dachen incident, to make the US policy clear as to what the United States “would or 
would not do” in regards to the defense of the Chinese Nationalist held offshore islands, 
exclusive of Formosa and the Pescadores. The president and his advisors concluded that 
the PRC was preparing to take back all of the Nationalist-held positions. If this occurred, 
American prestige and Asian allies’ confidence in the United States would be damaged, 
as well as deliver a deep blow to the morale of western-leaning countries in the region.
128
 
While the administration scrambled to arrest the failure of the MDT behind the scenes, 
the main voices of Eisenhower’s White House were sounding confident and nonchalant 
in public. Dulles told the press that the capture of Yijiangshan was of little overall 
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importance and Radford, after being asked if he was worried by the bold PLA move, 
responded by saying “I try not to worry too much about anything.”
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Secretary Dulles reported his conversation with Eisenhower and Radford to a 
meeting of State Department officials, CIA director Allen Dulles, and Special Assistant 
to the President Robert Cutler. They then decided, preliminarily, to make a public 
statement announcing that Nationalist forces ought to withdraw from some islands and 
regroup on others. Unofficially, Jiang’s military would withdraw from every offshore 
position except the Quemoy’s and Matsu. Dulles and his small group also concluded that 
America commit itself to possibly aid, with American armed forces, in the evacuation of 
the various untenable positions. This initial plan morphed into the Nationalist evacuation 
of all of the Dachen islands. To further make US policy clear, the United States pledged, 
in a major reversal of the decisions made at the Denver NSC meeting, to make public its 
intention to defend Big and Little Quemoy. In addition, protection of these specific 
locales needed to be executed with the backing of a Congressional resolution.
130
 Because 
the MDT failed to thwart the PRC, Dulles and Eisenhower decided, on January 19, 1955, 
ask Congress for an official finding giving the president special war powers to protect 
Taiwan and, if need be, the remaining offshore islands.
131
 This became known as the 
Formosa Resolution. 
Damage to the Nationalist military’s morale, as a result of the forced evacuation 
of the Dachen’s was a forgone conclusion by the administration and this became the 
justification for the defense of Quemoy. Dulles believed the actions of the PRC had 
forced the hand of the United States because of American commitments and treaties with 
allies in the region. Dulles understood the new policy they were considering increased the 
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risk of general war with the PRC. On January 19, 1955, during a White House meeting, 
the first uneasiness concerning a change with regards to the offshore islands surfaced. 
Under Secretary of State Robert R. Bowie, expressed apprehension about a categorical 
statement of support for Quemoy and suggested United States protection be predicated on 
UN action to restore peace to the Taiwan Straits. After the establishment of order, Bowie 
argued, America could end its defensive obligation to Quemoy. No mention of specific 
Nationalist positions, apart from Formosa and the Pescadores, ended up in the first draft 
of the administration’s idea of language for the Congressional action authorizing the 
president to use force.
132
 
During the January 19, 1955 meeting with Dulles, Eisenhower, and Radford, 
Dulles had advised the president the offshore islands could only be reliably supported 
with American military might.
133
 The secretary of state also stressed his view that United 
States “prestige” was suffering in the West Pacific as a result of the Dachen incident and 
nations in the region were viewing the US as running away from a fight. In addition, 
Dulles communicated his belief that Quemoy definitely held military significance, while 
the Dachen’s did not. Admiral Radford agreed with Dulles, saying that the United States 
needed to take a stand and even told the president that he preferred to hold all of the 
offshore islands the ROC controlled. However, the admiral acquiesced to the secretary’s 
Dachen evacuation plan. The decision to guard Quemoy and possibly Matsu, and make 
this determination public, occurred only in terms of a provisional defense until the UN 
could force a cease-fire.
134
 Despite Radford agreeing to the Dulles plan, the JCS 
Chairman a few days later had Admiral Robert Carney lay out an argument before 
Eisenhower detailing that evacuating the Dachen’s “would be much more arduous than 
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their defense or reinforcement” and that the whole plan was “unwise and wanted to 
register with the president the difficulties they foresaw.” The CIA gave its determination 
that the Communists would not attack while an evacuation was underway, undercutting 
the joint chiefs concerns.
135
 Radford and the chiefs, save Ridgway, were pushing for a 
harder line, but the president stuck with the Dulles plan. 
Dulles began, soon after the PLA raid on the Dachen’s, to tie America’s 
protection of specific islands to the idea that the support of these positions became 
necessary as a result of aggressive actions by PRC forces that followed an overall 
program designed to invade Formosa itself. Dulles admitted that the United States 
initially decided not to make it clear whether America would defend the Nationalist-held 
islands in an effort confuse Beijing. Eisenhower’s top diplomat conceded that this policy 
had “backfired” and the PRC did not believe the US would stand and fight. Dulles 
concluded the old approach of ambiguity needed to end.
136
  
The administration decided the language of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense 
Treaty reading “attacks directed against Formosa and the Pescadores” should be used to 
justify the American protection of Quemoy and Matsu. The president agreed to the plan 
of evacuating the Dachen’s, while promising to guard the closer groups of Matsu and 
Quemoy.
137
 Once discussion focused on a fresh doctrine for the Taiwan Straits, the initial 
divisions within the administration over the offshore islands resurfaced. 
Cutler warned that if the White House adopted the new policy, as Dulles 
proposed, America ran the risk of general war with the People’s Republic of China. The 
president disagreed, saying if China wanted war, no strategic change averted the 
possibility of PRC desired conflict with the US. Secretary of the Treasury George M. 
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Humphrey expressed his worry of defending Quemoy and Matsu because of their 
proximity to the mainland. As Humphrey put it, they were “right in the middle of Chinese 
Communist territory.” In response, Dulles argued that if America allowed the islands to 
succumb, then the US fell into a disadvantageous disposition for the eventual invasion of 
Formosa by the Communists. The secretary of state believed that if all the offshore 
positions fell to the Peoples Republic, then the damage to the morale of Nationalist 
fighting men made an effective defense of Formosa impossible. As a result of the PRC 
threats to invade Taiwan, Quemoy, necessarily, attained a more important role.
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Eisenhower expressed his agitation at the hand ringing and reiterated his belief 
that the new policy reduced the possibility of war as opposed to the current approach that 
he believed was driving America to war. Humphrey agreed that the United States should 
take a clear stand, but questioned why Quemoy needed to be included. Both Secretary of 
Defense Charles E. Wilson and Humphrey put forward the idea that all offshore islands 
should be evacuated except Formosa and the Pescadores and that defending the others 
made no sense. Wilson and the treasury secretary further advised that the administration 
should make it clear to the PRC that if they attacked Formosa and the Pescadores, the US 
would go to war.
139
 While this solution seems more in keeping with Dulles’ views of 
creating clear lines of demarcation in international diplomacy, the secretary of state 
attempted to find the middle ground within the heated debate. 
Dulles tried to reassure those in dissent by saying that in the future if Mao’s 
government renounced its declared intentions of invading Formosa that the United States 
might give up these islands. Dulles also made clear that if the United Nations’ action 
succeeded, America may then feel free to not support Quemoy and Matsu. He went even 
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further to placate those in disagreement after Nixon asked who endeavored to give the 
announcement of the policy. Dulles responded by saying that responsibility fell to the 
president, and Eisenhower finally relented and decided not to specify which islands 
would be defended in the statement. Even with this reassurance, Humphrey restated that 
he opposed a permanent safeguarding of Quemoy and even suggested the territory be 
traded for American Korean War POW’s still held in China.
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Dulles attempted to gain consensus by saying again the United States needed to 
make a decision and hold to it by evacuating the Dachen’s and possibly Matsu, but that 
Quemoy must be held. Wilson concluded for himself that if Mao’s government gave up 
its claim to Formosa, then Quemoy would need to be abandoned. Eisenhower asked 
Admiral Radford, if in the event Jiang voluntarily evacuated all of the offshore islands, 
what effect that decision would have on America’s strategic positions in the Taiwan area. 
Radford responded that the region had to be held if the American purpose was protecting 
Formosa. Even with the admiral’s support, the president weakened in his stance and 
suggested the US use language in a possible statement that avoided forcing America to 
protect the controversial territory indefinitely, emphasizing the immorality of abandoning 
the islands while expecting Jiang to fight for Formosa.
141
 
As word reached the British of America’s new policy, Britain expressed its 
unhappiness with the idea of a conditional defense of Quemoy. The British position 
sought a compromise in which the PRC gave up Formosa and in return, the Chinese 
Nationalists would relinquish the offshore islands. The UK opposed action in the UN if 
the US was including Quemoy in the area of protection against the PLA. The British 
asked if this relatively unimportant piece of land was really worth defending with nuclear 
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weapons as Dulles had previously told them. The secretary of state attempted to clarify 
the Eisenhower administration’s position by noting America’s policy did not include a 
“long term” plan to preserve the contentious areas. However, Dulles made clear that the 
morale within Nationalist allied ranks constituted a problem that the United States 
unequivocally needed to take into consideration.
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Dulles suggested the White House should be vague in public, but argued that the 
United States should supply the Republic of China with the specifics of the new strategy 
to defend Quemoy. However, this decision should be kept from the Russians and the 
PRC. Dulles argued that if Mao received warning of the US’s new position then any 
restraint on the part of the People’s Republic would garner sympathy within the world 
community and America would then lose the opportunity to look strong for Asia. He 
added that if the UN forced peace in the area, the latest policy with regards to Quemoy 
would become moot. As to the question of the use of atomic weapons, Dulles said their 
use needed to only occur as a last resort.
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Dulles reported to the 233
rd
 meeting of the National Security Council on January 
26, 1955, that the British were unhappy with the prospect of safeguarding the offshore 
islands with atomic weapons. The secretary of state continued by informing the council 
that the US position, clearly stating an express intention to protect Quemoy and Matsu, 
forced the United Kingdom to oppose work in the UN and if the US changed the specific 
nature of a public defense claim of Quemoy and Matsu in the Congressional 
authorization for the president to use force, the British may change course and support a 
UN resolution. Secretary Dulles advised the administration to communicate the new 
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policy privately to the Chinese Nationalists and, in a reversal of what he told the British, 
also inform the Chinese on the mainland.
144
 
Dulles changed his scheme by advising that the administration not make clear to 
the general public the administration intentions and retain a measure of ambiguity as to 
which offshore islands needed to be protected and which did not. The pressure within the 
Eisenhower White House as well as demands from the United Kingdom damaged 
Dulles’s latest plan on how to deal with the crisis. The president agreed, adding, 
vagueness in the statement to Congress liberated the UN to proceed with action, however, 
the US may do whatever it wanted behind the scenes. If the United Nations failed, on the 
other hand, then the diplomatic collapse freed the United States to enact a new policy to 
be formulated in the future.
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Secretary Humphrey reiterated his belief in the uselessness of Quemoy and the 
folly of US defense of the disputed real estate. The president, irritated, told the National 
Security Council that he had reviewed the maps of the area and Quemoy needed to be 
safeguarded from a strategic consideration. The president had come much closer to 
Radford’s point of view since the Dachen incident at the beginning of the month. 
Eisenhower concluded that he would rather be impeached than fail in his duty to protect 
America’s vital interests.
146
 The Security Council meeting decided in the end that 
Eisenhower would ask Congress for authority to defend Formosa and the Pescadores as 
well as other “related positions now in friendly hands.” The White House agreed to push 
UN action to bring peace to the Formosa area and to help evacuate the Dachen islands as 
well as any other offshore territories both the US and Republic of China decided on. 
Finally, the administration concluded that the defense of Matsu and Quemoy ought to be 
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predicated on the determination, by the commander in chief, that PLA attacks forewarned 
a first step to the invasion of Formosa and the Pescadores.
147
 Pressure from the British, as 
well as resistance within the administration to supporting the offshore islands, led 
Eisenhower and Dulles back into the trap of not deciding once and for all what the status 
of Quemoy and Matsu would be. Clarification for all the world to see was out of the 
administration’s grasp because they could not get past the belief that letting the offshore 
islands go would fatally damage the Republic of China. Within the context of Cold War 
theology, the first domino to fall could be Taiwan. The administration now had its 
response to the Dachen threat. America would convince the ROC to evacuate the 
Dachen’s, a new push for a cease fire in the straits through the UN would go forward, and 
a resolution would be put to the US Congress to authorize the president to use force to 
protect Formosa. 
On January 24 Eisenhower sent a message to Congress asking for permission to 
use force in the Taiwan Straits. As noted in chapter two, the president had already 
pledged as a candidate to seek Congressional authorization before using the military and 
fulfilled this pledge in the first month of 1955. Eisenhower laid out the case against the 
PRC and asked for the authority to engage the US military in aiding in a redeployment 
mission of Nationalist forces on offshore islands (Dachen’s) and any other “emergency 
action” the president felt was needed “to protect the rights and security of the United 
States.”
148
 Many democrats in Congress grumbled that the president was asking for a 
right he already possessed, echoing the belief that the move by Eisenhower was as much 
about politics and rebuking the Truman way of doing things than satisfying any 




Democratic Party annoyance, the resolution passed both house with relative ease. In the 
House the resolution passed on January 25 with a vote of 410-3 and once in the upper 
house was adopted 85-3 on January 28.
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If Eisenhower’s White House had decided to make an attempt of passing a 
resolution in the security council of the United Nations in regards to the straights crisis, 
Great Britain’s support would have to be secured. On January 21, 1955, Dulles informed 
Sir Roger M. Makins, British ambassador to the United States, and Sir Robert Heatlie 
Scott, Minister at the British Embassy in the United States, that the NSC resolved not to 
mention Quemoy and Matsu in any public statement. Dulles informed the United 
Kingdom’s representatives that the president intended to send a message to Congress and 
declare the aim of the United States to evacuate the Dachen’s, come up with rules of 
engagement for attacking Chinese Communists, state clearly that the treaty area remained 
static, and finally, America had chosen to accept and promote UN action to bring about a 
cease fire in the area. Dulles also informed the foreign dignitaries that the White House 
had opted to make preparations for attacks against the mainland in case of  a heavy 
incursion against Formosa, but that this plan remained secret. The secretary expressed his 
hope that the United States had dealt with British concerns and this would now allow 
them to go ahead with a United Nations proposition.
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John Foster Dulles made one last point to the British representatives. Dulles 
commented on a letter of January 21, 1955, sent by the UK government. The letter related 
British opinion that Formosa should be defended, that the Chinese Nationalists ought to 
restrain from attacking the PRC, and that the offshore islands needed to be turned over to 
Mao’s control. Dulles made clear that the United States could not “accept or give any 
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commitments with respect” to the disputed territories going back to the mainland. Sir 
Makins assured Dulles of the ambassador’s intention to recommend to his government 
movement in the United Nations and that he believed Britain could go ahead with 
backing a resolution in the UN Security Council, which Eden did on January 24.
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The complexity of the crisis only worsened with the diplomatic moves of Jiang 
and the KMT. Dulles told George Yeh, minister of foreign affairs for the Republic of 
China, that the United States intended to defend Matsu and Quemoy but this must not be 
made public, on January 21, 1955.
153
 The British, for their part, believed that the 
Eisenhower administration had backed off completely from “a provisional guarantee to 
defend Quemoy,” when in fact they had decided to simply not make their decision 
publicly known.
154
 How open the US had been with the British to get them to restart the 
UN process is an open question. Notes from the meeting between Dulles and Makins 
clearly show that Dulles only promised that “no statement” would be “publicly made 
regarding the intentions of the United states with respect to Quemoy and the Matsu 
Islands.”
155
 Was there further assurances privately made with regards to Quemoy that has 
never been documented? Either way, the British Cabinet was told by Anthony Eden, 
categorically, the US would not defend the offshore islands.
156
 The long term impact of 
the January 21 private assurance to Jiang with regards to Quemoy and Matsu would later 
come back to haunt the president in yet another ad hoc attempt at dealing with the crisis 
during the summer of 1955. In the meantime, despite this bit of good news for Taiwan, 
Yeh initially informed Dulles that the ROC did not intend on abandoning its position on 
the Dachen’s.
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 However, the next day the KMT government realized the implication of 
Dulles’s offer and informed the United States that it had agreed to the American proposal 
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Upon the announcement of the Dachen evacuation, Jiang once again insisted that 
the United States go public with its intentions to protect Quemoy and Matsu. Jiang also 
expressed his continued reservation on any action in the United Nations as well. Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson reiterated that no 
widespread statement concerning Quemoy and Matsu would be made and that the United 
States eschewed any attempt of possibly tying itself to any territories beyond those 
already spelled out in the MDT.
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 In an effort to placate the Nationalists, Robertson 
pointed out that United States’ decisions with regards to Taiwan, necessarily, made 
negotiations for the release of American fliers more difficult and that the issue did not 
supersede the preservation of Formosa and added no deal would be made that traded US 
pilots for islands.
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 The undersecretary also told Koo that the US military disagreed with 
the Nationalist ambassador’s assessment that evacuating from the Dachen’s constituted a 
mistake.
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 The joint chiefs of course had proclaimed exactly the opposite assessment the 
day before when they requested a special meeting with the president to inform him of 
their view that the evacuation of the Dachen’s was “unwise.”
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 It is conceivable that 
Robertson, half a world away, was not aware of this meeting, but it is less probable that 
he was not aware of Radford’s opposition to the Dulles plan. 
Generalissimo Jiang became upset that specific mention of the defense of the 
remaining offshore positions would not be made public at the time of the announcement 
for the evacuation of the Dachen’s. Jiang believed the Soviet Union had brought pressure 
on the British, and the United Kingdom then influenced the United States not to fight for 
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the islands. He believed the ceasefire proposal in the United Nations was appeasement 
that had encouraged the Communists to attack. As a result of Jiang’s presumption that the 
United States had abrogated its responsibilities under the terms of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty, he informed America that Taiwan thought better of asking the Eisenhower 
administration for help in evacuating the Dachen’s until the offshore issue was dealt with, 




During a national security meeting on January 30, that the president and Dulles 
did not attend, those that did attend expressed the opinion that Jiang was justified in being 
upset at the fact that the offering of a public statement about the defense of Quemoy and 
Matsu did not occur. The Security Council members in attendance lamented that tension 
occurred because of hazy language and reasoning surrounding the new policy authored 
by Dulles. The council also agreed that a delay in communicating American strategy to 
Taiwan as a result of a lag time between Yeh and Jiang contributed to the dispute. 
Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State, crystallized the groups thinking, by 
mentioning that the American defense of Quemoy and Matsu was a unilateral decision 
and not a bilateral agreement. He also reiterated that the United States needed to 




Eisenhower, upon being informed of Jiang’s misgivings, expressed the view that 
any attack on Quemoy and Matsu that he deemed “a threat to Formosa and the 
Pescadores” compelled the United States to fend off such a strike. The president did not 
want to bind the US to the support of Quemoy and Matsu indefinitely, and he would 
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decide on the necessity of engagement with the PRC over the islands. In the event of 
Communist invasion of any disputed territory in the Taiwan straits, and if the former 
supreme allied commander viewed such aggressive action as a prelude to the storming of 
Formosa, then he promised to order a complete defense of the Republic of China and this 
decision needed to remain undisclosed. This information might be passed along to the 
Generalissimo if he kept such information secret.
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 Jiang Jieshi finally became 
convinced of his new ally’s position and announced the Dachen withdrawal and officially 
requested American assistance. Rankin believed Jiang had stalled for time hoping the 
situation would change, allowing the United States to make a public statement on 
protection for Nationalist held islands.
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 Regardless, the White House’s plans for 
Quemoy were so confusing and convoluted that almost no one really knew where the 
administration stood on the issue. This was certainly part of the calculation by Dulles, 
however, confusing the PRC and even the British and ROC is one thing, but for members 
of Eisenhower’s Security Council and ambassadors not to be clear on the policy is a 
major failing of America’s Cold War strategy during the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-
55. 
The pressure from what seemed like all sides began to affect both Dulles and 
Eisenhower. The president lamented to Dulles at the end of January that most of the mail 
he was receiving was against any military action for the sake of Formosa.
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 A review of 
press reaction to the Formosa Resolution and the crisis in general revealed support for the 
president to defend Formosa but little backing for using the military to protect Nationalist 
coastal areas, let alone armed forays into mainland China. Senator Wayne Morse of 




the views of Morse were in the minority, as seen by the overwhelming support in the 
House and Senate for the Formosa Resolution, Eisenhower knew he was walking a very 
fine line in the straits. The president realized that the world and Congress saw a 
difference between Formosa and the Pescadores on one hand and the offshore islands on 
the other. Eisenhower himself came to the realization that the United States could not get 
tied down militarily to Matsu, Quemoy, and other positions exclusive of Formosa and the 
Pescadores because of the damage to America’s ability in fighting the spread of 
communism throughout the world.
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Eisenhower conceded that the administration had initially “contemplated” going 
public with the defense of Quemoy and Matsu after the Dachen attack, but that 
determination changed in his view because of the need to try and not get ham strung to a 
few islands off the coast of mainland China. Eisenhower reached the conclusion that the 
United States had to take into consideration the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
Europe in regards to its decisions over Formosa. Quemoy and Matsu would not be 
defended from every Chinese Communist attack and the commander in chief mentioned 
that an attack by a single “battalion” was not enough for the United States to go to war 
over.
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 The evolving policy of Eisenhower towards the Nationalist-held islands boiled 
down to whether the president viewed an attack as a prelude to an invasion of Formosa. 
Under this rubric, a categorical defense of Quemoy and Matsu could not be given despite 
his and Dulles’s initial decisions after the PLA attack on the Dachen’s. Domestic, 
international, and internal administration opposition to publicly declaring the US would 
defend Quemoy and Matsu once again was keeping Eisenhower from making clear to the 
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PRC and the world what America would do in the event of a PLA attack on the offshore 
islands. 
Aiding the Nationalist’s in evacuating the Dachen’s provided the US with unique  
problems, namely defining the rules of engagement. Eisenhower was determined that the 
operation itself not ignite a war when its whole purpose was to avoid a conflict. What 
would happen, however, if the PLA attacked the ROC or the Seventh Fleet during the 
delicate abandonment of the Dachen’s? With White House direction, the Navy gave 
orders to Seventh Fleet to take care and not to be overly aggressive during the Dachen 
evacuation and start a war.
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 Eisenhower understood the danger of losing control of a 
precarious situation, so he told the military that they were not to attack PRC bases on the 
mainland immediately after a possible first strike by the PLA, but only respond if it was 
continuous and only against fields “positively identified and contributing forces to the 
attack against us.”
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 In addition, if any actions against the PRC became necessary, then 
atomic weapons were not to be included in attacking PRC bases.
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As the Seventh Fleet was preparing to aid in the Dachen evacuation, Eisenhower 
wrote his friend, General Alfred Gruenther, who was serving as Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe at the time of the crisis. Eisenhower told Gruenther that public 
relations were an important and difficult element in the crisis. In the depths of the Cold 
War, it is letters to the men Ike truly trusted that one can see the president’s ability to see 
all sides of an issue and demonstrate that he was more of a moderate than he was perhaps 
viewed at the time. Eisenhower saw the extremes of all sides and looks in hindsight very 
much like a figure caught between them. The president lamented these extremes by 
describing the PRC demonization of the west and complained that the ROC only wanted 
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“immediate direct and destructive attack on Red China.” In America “jingoists and 
pacifists,” were the only voices driving the debate on American foreign affairs. The 
backdrop for the entire affair was of course the competition of Communist versus 
capitalist theories of government and economics.
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Eisenhower saw the Nationalist-held islands as traditionally a part of mainland 
China. On their own merit, the coastal positions were not worth “American intervention.” 
According to Eisenhower, China did not pose an immediate direct threat to the US, but 
continued pressure in the Pacific would make them so and perhaps threaten the 
Philippines and Indonesia. Eisenhower recounted to Gruenther Hitler’s statements before 
World War II and compared them to the statements of China and the Soviet Union. The 
president told his friend that he would not make a definite commitment to the offshore 
islands as a result of too many long-term problems that would be associated with them. 
However, because of ROC morale, the US had to give some assurances with regards to 
the coastal positions, but less than those given in the MDT. Eisenhower declared that “we 
must make a distinction (this is a difficult one) between an attack that has only as its 
objective the capture of an offshore island and one that is primarily a preliminary 
movement to an all-out attack on Formosa.” Eisenhower finished by saying that, 
“Whatever is now to happen, I know that nothing could be worse than global war,”  and 
that he did not believe the USSR wanted a war at that time.
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However, it was not Gruenther that Eisenhower needed to convince, it was the 
American public and probably more importantly, the British. Eisenhower wrote to Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill, who was serving in his second stint as prime minister, in an 
attempt to explain US actions with regards to Formosa. The president explained that the 
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pressure on him was to be aggressive with regards to Formosa while it was the opposite 
for Churchill. Eisenhower said the Communists knew this and were continuing to be 
aggressive in the hopes of dividing America and Britain. Eisenhower made the Domino 
Theory argument by saying that if Communism was to “penetrate the island barrier” in 
the Pacific, the Philippines and Indonesia would fall and then the whole region would go 
Communist. According to the president, the US was supporting and arming the ROC, but, 
the Nationalists were not content to stay on Formosa and their whole psychology 
revolved around the idea that someday they would return to the mainland. If Quemoy and 
Matsu were lost, then that would “destroy the reason for the existence of the Nationalist 
forces on Formosa” and Communists would take over. Because the morale of the ROC 
was of such importance, Jiang’s government “must have certain assurances with respect 
to the offshore islands.” Eisenhower continued that those assurances could not be as 
concrete as those in the MDT, which was passed the day before in the Senate, so, 
America would protect the Nationalist-held islands only if their being attacked was a 
prelude to an attack on Formosa. President Eisenhower said this was a difficult decision. 
He believed that the USSR did not want a war at that time but may be forced into one if 
the US and China started fighting. Eisenhower concluded by saying, “we believe our 
policy is the best that we can design for staying out of such a fight.”
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Churchill responded that the US could not, of course, allow the PRC to destroy 
the ROC. He argued, however, that the offshore islands should be divorced from this 
issue and the Republic of China should not be allowed to attack the mainland while the 
US was protecting Jiang. This was an argument the Eisenhower administration had 
already dealt with in the exchange of notes accompanying the Mutual Defense Treaty. 
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The main contention between US and British policy was, however, the coastal positions 
in which Churchill said “are legally part of China and which nobody here considers a just 
cause of war” and that he could not “see any decisive relationship between the offshore 
islands and an invasion of Formosa.” Churchill continued by saying that the US could 
easily defend an invasion directed at Formosa from Quemoy if the PRC eventually 
captured it and alluded to the WWII D-Day invasion to make his point.
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Europe was more important, according to the prime minister, and, echoing 
Eisenhower’s earlier statement, said that the Quemoy crisis may be a Communist ruse to 
split the allies. Jiang, according to Churchill, could not continue to say they were going to 
take back the mainland, even if it was to rally continued support around him. The prime 
minister told Eisenhower that, “He deserves the protection of your shield but not the use 
of your sword.” Churchill offered a policy change saying that America should “defend 
Formosa and the Pescadores as a declared resolve” and “announce the United States 
intention to evacuate all the off-shore islands, including Quemoy in the same way as the 
Tachens, and to declare that they will do this at their convenience within (say) three 
months.” The US should “intimate also by whatever channel or method is thought best 
that the United States will treat any proved major attempt to hamper this withdrawal as 
justification for using whatever conventional force is required.” Churchill continued by 
saying that the “coastal islands must not be used as stepping stones either by the 
Communists towards the conquest of Formosa or the Nationalists towards the conquest of 
China. But they might all too easily become the occasion of an incident which would 
place the United States before the dilemma of either standing by while their allies were 
butchered or becoming embroiled in a war for no strategic or political purpose.” Despite 
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the differences between the two old allies’, Churchill ended by pleading that, “our 




In response, Eisenhower wrote the US:  
does not have decisive power in respect of the offshore islands…We must 
not lose Chiang’s army and we must maintain its strength, efficacy and 
morale. Only a few months back we had both Chiang and a strong, well-
equipped French Army to support the free world’s position in Southeast 
Asia. The French are gone-making it clearer than ever that we cannot 
afford the loss of Chiang unless all of us are to get completely out of that 
corner of the globe. This is unthinkable to us-I feel it must be to you.   
The US, Eisenhower argued, had done much diplomatically to create a cease-fire. He said 
that “We rounded out the far Pacific security chain by a Treaty with the Nationalists 
which, however, only covered specifically Formosa and the Pescadores, thus making it 
clear to Chiang and to the entire world that we were not prepared to defend the coastal 
positions as Treaty territory.” The president mentioned the signing statement, which 
ensured that the offshore islands could not be used by the ROC to attack the PRC and 
gain back the mainland. Eisenhower also said “we have done much more than seems 
generally realized.” The US had made the Dachen evacuation possible and convinced 
Jiang to go along with Oracle. The result of all this work to preserve the peace was that 
the Chinese Communists had viewed those efforts as weakness.
179
  
Eisenhower argued that the US still had American airmen being held by the 
People’s Republic of China held over from Korean War. He expressed the frustration that 
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virtually all of the members of the administration were feeling by saying, “There comes a 
point where constantly giving in only encourages further belligerency.” He made 
allusions to the lessons of Munich, but, in the current crisis, the PRC had not even 
bothered to promise anything and instead had actually said they would continue their 
aggression. If the US retreated from the offshore islands, then morale would collapse in 
the ROC and Formosa would easily fall. America, according to the president, could not 
indefinitely keep the PRC from invading Formosa without the ROC army as a 
breakwater. The PLA could launch secret attacks easily, as demonstrated in Korea, and 
from many points of departure. Eisenhower relayed that it had taken two days to 
assemble an evacuation force for the Dachen’s, which were, at the point of Eisenhower’s 
letter, back at their bases in the Philippines and Japan.
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Eisenhower’s closing argument began with the statement; “if we appear strong 
and coercive only toward our friends, and should attempt to compel Chiang to make 
further retreats, the conclusion of these Asian peoples will be that they had better plan to 
make the best terms they can with the Communists.” The US had demonstrated in 
Formosa and Korea that America was “not careless in letting others get us into a major 
war.” In a perhaps undiplomatic presentation, Eisenhower said Britain should trust 
America in this matter because of its greater knowledge and responsibility in this area. 
The president said “it would surely not be popular in this country if we become involved 
in possible hostilities on account of Hong Kong or Malaya, which our people look upon 
as ‘colonies’-which to us is a naughty word. Nevertheless, I do not doubt that, if the issue 




Despite the presidents’ arguments, the pressure from the British was decisive in 
moderating the Eisenhower administration’s handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis. The 
opposing force to the British was a wide spread belief within the US government, both 
executive and legislative, that the west was losing the Cold War, especially in Asia. A 
national intelligence estimate released in mid-February stated that the “greatest 
importance of the offshore islands at present is political and psychological.” If the PRC, 
and more broadly the world wide Communist movement, won on the Nationalist-held 
positions, it would be a continuous “string of communist victories in Asia, i.e., mainland 
China, Korea, Indochina and the Tachens. Conversely, any further loss or yielding of 
these islands will be a serious blow to CHINAT morale and regarded by the remaining 
anti-communist nations in Asia as a further disastrous retreat by the U.S., since at present, 
the U.S. is so closely identified with the Chinese Nationalists that any CHINAT reverse 
will be viewed as a U.S. loss.” Both the PRC and ROC would not favor a cease-fire 
because it would disrupt both of their long term goals vis-a-vi the other.
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 Despite this 
growing worry, the administration was moving further and further away from 
unequivocally defending the offshore islands. However, frustration at the actions of 
Mao’s government was making Dulles re-think America’s policy of restraining Jiang. 
After receiving a briefing on Formosa in Manila in mid-February, Dulles wrote to 
the president asking for some clarification and guidance on issues relating to the 
continuing crisis. Dulles said that the US would not defend a variety of coastal islands 
near the Dachen’s, specifically mentioning the island of Nanchi. Dulles expressed the 
hope that Nanchi would be evacuated by the Nationalists, but would not press the issue if 
Jiang felt that ROC morale would suffer greatly. Dulles continued by reaffirming that the 
 68 
US would help Taiwan defend Quemoy and Matsu with material, but not “direct 
intervention.” He said America should also start stationing more US troops on Formosa 
in light of the MDT and Formosa resolution. Dulles claimed to be “impressed” with PRC 
buildup on the mainland and that very soon it may come to a point where only US 
intervention would allow the west to hold Quemoy and Matsu. Atomic weapons would 
“perhaps” be needed. Dulles suggested that the US must “consider allowing the 
Nationalists to attack by air this build-up, in the absence of any dependable assurance that 
it will not be used against Taiwan.” The US had been restraining the ROC with the hopes 
that a UN cease-fire could be brokered. He requested that he be allowed to tell Eden that 
the US could not hold back Taiwan forever.
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Eisenhower responded that, according to a security council decision, the US 
would not aid in defending the island of Nanchi. Eisenhower continued that the US 
would aid the Nationalists on their offshore positions with material and logistical support, 
but America would only get more involved if attacks were determined to be the precursor 
to an attack on Formosa, but, “any offensive military participation on our part will be 
only by order of the President.”
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Both Dulles and Eisenhower, and especially Dulles, were becoming ever more 
concerned that the PRC was intent on striking at Formosa. Despite all of their efforts, the 
US was struggling to gain some sort of foundation on which to work from. Both of these 
men, throughout the crisis, experimented with various policies to end the crisis, and this 
experimentation was continuing. Dulles met with Eden on Formosa and told him, after 
being cleared to do so by the president, that the administration now believed the PRC was 
actively seeking to take Taiwan by force as opposed to what they had believed just a few 
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weeks before. Dulles explained that there was a large buildup on the mainland conducted 
by the PRC and that the US would have problems continuing to hold back the ROC from 
attacking these positions. The US had done a great many things to prevent war in area, 
but the PRC seemed resolute and did not seem to care for a peaceful settlement. Dulles 
told Eden that America could not retreat any longer and to give up the Nationalist-held 
islands would damage the morale of democracies in Asia and Taiwan. Eden’s view was 
that Taiwan should not be given to the Communists, but relayed to Dulles that Churchill 
did not see it as a strategic issue for the west, but would support America nevertheless. 
Eden warned Dulles that the world would support the US on Taiwan, but not the offshore 
islands. Eden was of the opinion that the PRC would not attack Taiwan, but might attack 
the coastal positions to get the US in to a trap that would cause US relations with its allies 
to suffer. Eden said he did not see the necessity of holding the controversial territory and 
asked US Admiral Felix B. Stump, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, and Dulles 
why America was so determined to support the offshore islands. Stump gave a tactical 
assessment of the positions, which the British military disagreed with. Dulles defended 
the American policy by saying that the British were not fully considering the morale 
aspect of the offshore islands. Eden then said he wanted to see if the PRC would give up 




Writing back to the president on the meeting with the British foreign secretary, 
Dulles recounted to Eisenhower that Eden had told him that he would try to get the PRC 
to avoid a military solution to the Formosa situation. Dulles believed that this venture 
would fail and that it would then make it easier for Eden to push the US agenda in the 
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UK parliament. This was wishful thinking on the part of Dulles. At no point in the crisis 
did the United Kingdom ever give the impression that defending the offshore islands for 
the Republic of China would ever gain support in the British Parliament or in the minds 
of its people. With all of the shifting statements, both publicly and privately, by everyone 
involved in the affair, the one consistent message coming from Churchill’s government 
was: no war for Quemoy. The secretary continued by relaying that Eden suggested that 
the US should back off of Oracle while he made his approach to the PRC. Dulles did 
agree to a “further brief period request for a cease-fire resolution so as to permit this other 
initiative,” but if Eden failed however, Dulles wanted to go forward with UN action. 
Eden had told Dulles that a fallback position was to give up Quemoy and Matsu and this 
was supported in the commonwealth and Europe. The supremacy, dare even the 
obsession, with the morale of Jiang’s troops and allies in the region were ever present in 
American calculation. Dulles relayed to Eisenhower the secretary’s response to Eden on 
this matter by confiding his belief that Eden did not have a full appreciation of the issue 
of the morale in the non-Communist countries in the Far East.
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Dulles had told Eden that he hoped the Nationalists could defend the islands on 
their own, but if the president saw any armed action as a prelude to an attack on Formosa, 
the US would have to intervene. Dulles told Eisenhower that he had:  
reminded Eden that there must come a time in these matters where will to 
stand must be made manifest. In case of Hitler, Eden himself recognized 
that this had come too late. It should have come in relation to 
Czechoslovakia rather than Poland, and if it had come earlier, there might 
not (repeat not) have been the Second World War. Eden agreed that there 
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was a parallel but still seemed feel that we could afford a further retreat. I 
said this was a grave decision where you would have to exercise final 
responsibility and that the entire world could know you would do so with 
the sober sense of responsibility and dedication to peace with freedom.
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Dulles and Eisenhower now believed that they had gone too far in placating the 
PRC. They were convinced that America could not back down any longer. The 
Eisenhower administration believed they had done much to ensure peace by enacting the 
US-Taiwan MDT including the exchange of notes that placed limits on ROC offensive 
actions and they had pushed for the Dachen’s evacuation. They had restrained the ROC 
from attacking a PRC buildup on the mainland and saw to it a limited Formosa resolution 
did not specify the offshore islands. The US also convinced the ROC to sign on to a UN 
ceasefire proposition even though Jiang did not want to. In addition, Dulles believed that 
“We have resisted powerful popular and Congressional pressure to take retaliatory action 
against the Chinese Communists for their flagrant offense to the US in imprisoning our 
airmen captured in the Korean War.”
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Despite all of this work, the People’s Republic of China, in response, had become 
more belligerent and built up air bases and forces around Formosa on the mainland. 
Therefore, the US “have gone as far as is prudent in making concessions.” If the PRC 
gave up its claim to take Formosa by force, the US could negotiate further at that time. 
Dulles believed that at the very least the PRC was probing to see if the US would fight. 
Dulles argued to the British that simply handing over the offshore islands to the 
Communists was a step the US could not take. He said that to:  
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pressure the Republic of China into surrender of Quemoy and Matsu 
would (1) Importantly increase attacking capacity of the Chinese 
Communists by making more available Amoy and Fuchow harbors, the 
natural staging grounds for a sea attack; (2) greatly weaken morale of the 
Republic of China on Formosa and increase opportunity of Chinese 
Communists subversion; (3) probably increase the Chinese Communists’ 
intention probe our resolution by putting it to the test of action. In other 
words, further retreat would, in our opinion, both weaken the defense 
capability Formosa and increase the risk that that capability will be put to 
the test of battle.
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Despite the hard line the Eisenhower administration was taking with the British 
and because he was not going to overtly pressure Jiang to abandon positions like 
Quemoy, Eisenhower had decided that he was not going to give a blanket promise to 
defend the offshore islands either. At the first meeting between the US and the Republic 
of China under the Mutual Defense Treaty, the US made clear that it could not commit to 
the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. The president would decide when and if the US 
would defend those positions. Dulles, at this meeting, took personal responsibility for any 
misunderstandings in the past on this issue. Dulles said the ROC’s continual claims at 
armed re-conquest of the mainland were minimizing its important role in the world. The 
chance might arise to do this in the future but it “could not be created by the Republic of 
China alone.” Jiang agreed and said that the MDT would be adhered to and he would not 
initiate large-scale military actions without consultation with the US. However, Jiang 
declared that he could never agree to a cease-fire as envisioned by Oracle. Dulles 
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responded that he was not asking for Jiang to support Oracle, but was asking that he not 
veto the UN resolution and let the USSR do so for its own crass political reasons. Jiang 
considered the crisis an international affair and not a civil war like the PRC. Earlier in the 
conversation Dulles also brought up the issue of the Soviet ship Taupse, which the 
Nationalists had seized. Dulles wanted Jiang to release the ship and its crew arguing that 
there was no benefit to America or Taiwan by continuing to hold them. Jiang said he 
would do so only after the PRC had released the American flyers. Dulles expressed his 
displeasure with this decision by saying he did not like that idea.
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After Dulles’s early March visit to Taipei, the secretary returned believing that the 
straits crisis was worse than he had thought previously.
191
 Early in the crisis the 
administration had spoken of the need for the use of atomic weapons to defend the 
offshore islands and Formosa. Once Dulles convinced Eisenhower and the other members 
of the Security Council that the situation on the ground in the Taiwan Straits was 
worsening, although not all believed the threat was imminent, the discussion of the use of 
atomic weapons deployment increased. The administration was particularly concerned 
about what effect a war, especially an atomic war, would have on Europe. The United 
States had become a global power following World War II and decisions in one corner of 
the world could have significant impact on American interests in another part of the 
globe. During this period, Western European countries were in the process of writing and 
signing treaties to integrate both their defensive establishments and their economies. The 
modern day European Union began during the post WWII era to find a way to ensure that 
the disaster of the 30’s and 40’s never happened again.  
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In 1955, several European countries were attempting to negotiate and sign a treaty 
that was known as the European Defense Community (EDC). The primary goal of this 
particular agreement was to re-arm Western Germany and integrate it into Europe’s 
defensive establishment. The main opponent to this was France. Dulles was one of the 
major architects of this pact.
192
 The secretary of state and Eisenhower wanted to delay a 
possible war with China as long as possible while the EDC was being negotiated and 
hopefully, ratified by the governments involved. Any use of atomic weapons in Asia 
would surely threaten everything the administration was working on in Europe. 
Eisenhower wanted to “avoid direct US intervention in the Formosa area, at a 
time while the Western European Treaties were pending; to limit US intervention as 
much as possible if it became necessary to intervene.” Air Force Joint Chief General 
Nathan Twining believed that Formosa would not be attacked soon by the PRC because 
there was not a significant build up on airfields in the offshore area. Eisenhower, for his 
part, wanted the ROC to do more artillery fire on the mainland, since that was what the 
PRC was doing, and retaliation in kind would not escalate the conflict. To defend 
Formosa, Admiral Carney suggested that US personnel would have to increase from 1000 
to 11,000. Dulles, again concerned about the EDC, said that atomic weapons should not 
be used in the first forty to sixty days of an all-out war. The president agreed, not wanting 
to disrupt the European treaties. To underscore how seriously the administration was 
bracing for a probable war, Eisenhower advocated using napalm against invading troops 
if atomic weapons were not immediately used. He continued by saying that conventional 
weapons may not be “decisive; that the time might come when the US might have to 
intervene with atomic weapons, but that should only come at the end, and we would have 
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to advise our allies first” and “that we are confronted with an extremely delicate situation, 
because we could not afford to be isolated from our allies in the world, and that our aim 




Domestic and international opposition, along with fears of how US policy in Asia 
would affect the EDC, kept the Eisenhower administration from publicly announcing a 
new plan to defend Quemoy and Matsu in the wake of the PLA Dachen Island’s attack in 
early January 1955. On the other side of the equation, the belief within the administration 
that any blow to the morale of Nationalist troops, as a result of losing the offshore islands 
in disgrace, forced Eisenhower and Dulles to oppose abandoning the disputed territories 
in the Taiwan Straits. The American position, as all knew, was untenable over the long 
term. Something had to change in America’s calculations if war was to be avoided. Cold 






Stalemate: The Robertson-Radford Mission, Bandung, Negotiation, and the 1958 
Crisis 
Within the historiographical literature of the Taiwan Straits Crises of 1954-55, it 
is often given second billing next to the 1958 Crisis. One of the goals of this study is to 
reverse that interpretation and only treat the 1958 event as a postscript to the imbroglio 
several years before. The dynamics that did not allow Eisenhower and Dulles to make a 
clear decision on the offshore islands were forged even before the September 1954 
shelling of Quemoy and remained the catalyst for the resumption of hostilities in 1958. In 
fact the morale of Nationalist troops became even more important in the second crisis 
because Jiang used the interim period to pour even more of his troops onto Quemoy. The 
administration was still unwilling to write off the offshore islands because of the KMT 
morale issue but could still not give a full throated defense of them because of a lack of 
worldwide public support. These dynamics continued to drive Eisenhower to attempt a 
strange diplomatic mission to Jiang in an effort to convince him to decide for himself to 
either abandon or drastically reduce his forces on the disputed territories. Even when the 
PRC signaled its willingness to negotiate, little was accomplished because the status of 
the offshore islands was still in limbo and as a result the 1958 Crisis occurred. 
Although General Nathan Twining was not convinced of an imminent attack in 
March 1955, Dulles was busy moving the bureaucracy in the direction of making the hard 
decisions that war with China would force on America. He was convinced that the PRC 
was going to “try and capture Formosa” and only a “successful defense” would dissuade 
them. ROC army loyalty to Jiang was in question and as a result, the administration 
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needed to educate the American public on the possibility of intervention, including 
defending Quemoy and Matsu. In a memo detailing Dulles’s points from a national 
security meeting, he reiterated that the US should stall until the treaties in Europe were 
completed, but, they had to decide whether atomic weapons would be used tactically and 
then prepare the world for atomic weapons use to make up for the perceived “deficiency” 
in conventional forces that America had in the area. Dulles, in a chilling final thought, 




The M31 “Honest John” rocket had the capability to handle an atomic war head 
and was the first US designed delivery system for tactical nuclear weapons.
195
 By the 
beginning of April, the military began the process of identifying atomic weapons in the 
American arsenal that could be transferred to the Taiwan region. General Ridgway 
reported to Radford that the US Army had eight Honest John batteries. Five were in 
Europe and one was on its way. One was undergoing testing and an eighth was scheduled 
for deployment in Japan by June 1955, but could be put on Formosa. Ridgway continued 
that those in Europe, up to six, could be transferred to Formosa. Underscoring what these 




The administration, from nearly its beginning, attempted to develop a new 
strategy to meet Communist challenges around the world without bankrupting the US 
treasury in the process.  Dulles, with Eisenhower’s blessing, developed what has become 
known as the “New Look” defense policy which was largely in place by 1954. 
Eisenhower and Dulles decided to rely on America’s nuclear arsenal and, in a major shift 
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from post WWII strategy, diminish the US’s standing army forces in favor of propping 
up allies around the world and drawing them into a vast collective security arrangement. 
Foreign, front line, countries would form a buffer for the US while it focused on funding 
less expensive air, naval forces, and other delivery systems for atomic weapons.
197
 In 
keeping with the ‘New Look,’ Dulles was convinced that the US could not match 
Communist conventional forces on the battlefield and therefore atomic weapons would 
inevitably be needed in any defense of Formosa and the offshore islands. Dulles told the 
president that the use of atomic weapons would need to be used to protect Quemoy and 
Matsu, which Eisenhower heartily agreed with. Eisenhower responded by saying that he 
believed atomic missiles were the only way to take out Chinese Communist forces in the 
area and conventional weapons could not do the job.
198
  Dulles stressed to the president 
that there was a difference between tactical atomic weapons versus “the big bomb with 
huge radio-active fallouts,” and that the administration needed to educate the public about 
the difference.
199
 One of the more frightening thoughts about this time period in Cold 
War history is how close it actually resembled the famous Stanley Kubrick and Peter 
Sellers movie Dr. Strangelove. A few years after the 54-55 incident during the second 
Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Nathan Twining 
exclaimed in an NSC meeting that he “could not understand the public horror at the idea 
of using nuclear weapons.”
200
 
The administration was talking itself into the inevitability of having to use nuclear 
weapons if a war started in Asia. Admiral Stump in the Pacific theatre warned Dulles and 
Eisenhower that if the PRC put in major air force power in the area, the US would have 
to use the ultimate weapon. Conventional forces would not be enough and “special 
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weapons” would have to be used if the US had to attack deep into China to destroy its air 
power.
201
 Dulles continued to warn that the US must avoid atomic weapons use in the 
next sixty days because of the Europe situation. Both Dulles and the president believed 
that America had to give the ROC the tools it needed to defend themselves in the near 
term and that US troops needed to stay “well below a figure of ten thousand.”
202
  
The defense department was also coming to the conclusion that a PRC and US 
war was “a real probability.” Secretary of Defense Wilson believed that the 
administration’s attempt to enforce a cease-fire and also separate the offshore issue from 
Formosa had failed. Wilson told the Joint Chief that “the Chinese Communists will 
continue to probe the real intentions of the U.S., by increasing military actions against the 
off-shore islands” and “that the Chinese Communists are likely to believe that U.S. 
political considerations, both domestic and international, will inhibit U.S. from reacting 
militarily to attacks on the off-shore islands or at least from using atomic weapons, 
should they attack, and that subsequently they would soon be able to take over Formosa.” 




While the president was trying to keep the administration’s deliberations private, 
the Secretary of Defense was busy making life for the president more complicated in 
public remarks in mid-March. Wilson had boasted of a more powerful bomb than a 
hydrogen bomb to reporters and said “that the loss or retention of Quemoy and the 
Matsu’s would make little difference in the long run.” Infuriated, Eisenhower personally 
dressed down the secretary of defense and added in his diary that “While I think that he 
considers himself a master of public relations, he seems to have no comprehension at all 
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of what embarrassment such remarks can cause the Secretary of State and me in our 




Even members of the military were speaking to the press and predicting imminent 
war. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Carney was identified as the source for some 
comments that gave to “newspaper reporters a behind the scenes account of possible 
attack by Chinese Communists against Formosa.” Eisenhower told Dulles that if Wilson 
did not regain control that the “President himself will take charge of Defense 
Department.” In the mean time the press, according to Eisenhower, should be told to look 
at statements given by Dulles to gain a more accurate appraisal of the situation in the 
straits.
205
 Carney eventually apologized for his comments personally to the president; 
however, Eisenhower was finding it more and more difficult to stay ahead of the crisis.
206
 
Underlying Dulles’s fear that war was close was the belief that the US could not 
back down any longer. In the minds of the men who were making the decisions of 
whether or not to go to war, the US, and by extension the west, was losing the Cold War 
in Asia. Dulles said in private and in public that the PRC was basking and emboldened by 
successes in Korea, Vietnam, and forcing the Nationalists to evacuate the Dachen’s. 
Peoples Republic of China aggression would not stop until the west stood up to them. He 
warned that if Formosa was lost then New Zealand and Australia would go next. Dulles 
continued to argue that “with respect to the defense of Formosa…this was only partially a 
military problem. The major factors of morale and psychology were involved.” Dulles 
said that if you look at a map, it looks like a smart thing to give up the offshore islands, 
but this would destroy morale on Formosa. In an extraordinary and hyperbolic 
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declaration, Dulles tied the fortunes of America and the West to Asia and a small 
defeated army on a collection of coastal fortifications in the South China Sea. Dulles 
concluded that “therefore, the loyalty and morale of the forces on Formosa became a vital 
link to the whole Western position” and the US would have to attack the mainland to 
defend the offshore islands.
207
 
Even the usually moderate Eisenhower expressed his deepest Cold War fears 
during the crisis to friends. At the end of March 1955, the president wrote to Lewis 
William Douglas, former US ambassador to the UK, whose public service stretched back 
to the depression era, and told him that “I have come to the conclusion that some of our 
traditional ideas of international sportsmanship are scarcely applicable in the morass in 
which the world now flounders.” Eisenhower lamented that the US was “in a life and 
death struggle of ideologies. It is freedom against dictatorship; Communism against 
capitalism; concepts of human dignity against materialistic dialectic.” The president 
believed that Communists were bent, as they had declared themselves, on world 
revolution and the overthrow of every non-Communist country by violent revolution. 
Eisenhower characterized this movement, and the people who espoused it, as lacking in 
“honor, decency and integrity.” He proclaimed that the history of America would end if 
the Communists won, clearly echoing the old adage that history is written by the victors. 
Eisenhower expressed in this letter to Lew Douglas, a very real existential debate the 
president was having with himself. He believed in the principles of honor, duty, right and 
wrong, and the dishonor of “breaking faith with our friends.” However, to allow the 
Communists victory out of squeamishness to use tactics that would deliver success for 
the West, would have inexcusable repercussions for free people around the world. 
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Eisenhower said he thought that Truman had been right to oppose the Communists in 
Korea. However, that did not mean the US “must” or “should fight for Quemoy and the 
Matsu’s. What I am asking you is this: If you became convinced that the capture of these 
two places by international Communism would inevitably result in the later loss of 
Formosa to the free world, what would you do?” Eisenhower truly believed that if 
Formosa fell, then the rest of Asia would soon to follow.
208
 
Despite Eisenhower and Dulles’s flights of Cold War ideological fancy, the 
pressure from Britain and the American public was forcing the two into cold hard reality. 
Going to war over the offshore islands was simply not an acceptable decision. General 
Gruenther in early April wrote to the president and told him that Anthony Eden 
“considers the Quemoy-Matsu issue the only one of any importance between the US and 
UK.” Gruenther stated that not one percent of the British people would support America 
if it went to war over Quemoy and Matsu adding, “I don’t think I could do much to 
increase that percentage no matter how hard I tried.”
209
 Dulles and Eisenhower, once 
again, went to work on improvising a solution to the offshore islands. On February 21, 
1955, the president and Dulles hatched a scheme to plant a seed in the mind of Jiang 
Jieshi. That seed was the idea to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu of his own volition, 
thereby removing the administration from having to force the issue on the Generalissimo 
and risk the loss of ROC morale.
210
 
Eisenhower confirmed his desire to increase personnel on Formosa itself, but he 
suggested, in a dramatic example of how the crisis had stubbornly refused to yield an 
acceptable solution, that this pledge come in conjunction with a pledge from Jiang to 
withdraw either completely or partially from Quemoy and Matsu. Eisenhower was slowly 
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coming around to the British point of view that the offshore islands were an intractable 
problem for the US and in need of radical re-thinking. In addition to more American 
troops on the ground on Formosa, the president wanted to offer Jiang more support for 
the Nationalist air force and navy. Eisenhower wanted Jiang to evacuate the coastal 
islands, but the only way to do this was to “make” Jiang “ostensibly the originator of the 
idea.” The president said Jiang would probably never agree to this and “the need for 
preserving his force as a part of our security arrangements in that region should not be 
lost sight of in our efforts to make him see that great difficulties involved in the defense 
of the coastal islands.” If Jiang was resolute in staying on the offshore islands then the 
US opposition to ROC operations on the PRC buildup on mainland China could not be 
maintained indefinitely and this could be relayed to Eden. Eisenhower ordered that the 




Radford came to the president in early April wanting to put 10,000 US personnel 
on Formosa. Eisenhower decided that he only wanted “small sections of technicians and 
advisers to be attached to ChiNat units.” The president was inching his way back to the 
idea of having Jiang withdraw from the coastal positions, but first toyed with the idea of 
simply demoting them in importance. Eisenhower told Radford that he wanted the 
offshore islands to only be considered as outposts and not major strongholds. He was 
willing to give Jiang a division and air wing on Formosa only if the coastal fortifications 
were demoted in value and both ROC and American prestige were not tied to them. 
Morale was the biggest issue with respect to Quemoy and Matsu and it was his 
determination to untangle ROC troop confidence from being wrapped up in controlling 
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the offshore islands. America could not force Jiang into this decision, so Jiang had to 
decide for himself that this was the correct course to take. The US, for its part, should 
encourage this in Jiang with a little help from American advisers the he trusted, such as 
Secretary Robertson or retired General Albert Coady Wedemeyer, the last of which spoke 




Eisenhower crystallized his new thinking by telling Dulles that the Chinese 
Nationalists have “some right to assume” the US would protect the offshore islands. 
However, to do so would raise the ire of foreign and domestic support. American prestige 
would be attached and therefore tie down the US there indefinitely. On the other hand, if 
the US refused to help, the consequences could be equally as bad because of the morale 
issue and it could set the stage for yet another defeat at the hands of the Communists. The 
two choices were “unacceptable.” Therefore, a change in the situation must be attained. 
World opinion favored the defense of Formosa itself, but not for the offshore islands. The 
coastal positions presented difficulties both political and militarily. The reality was that 
they were “difficult to defend.” To effectively guard them, the US would have to attack 
the mainland, whereas, that was not the case for Formosa, where the US could use its 
superior naval forces. The US would “probably” have to use atomic weapons in any 
offshore defense and if the struggle expanded into a worldwide conflict, the US would be 
at a disadvantage because domestic and world opinion would be against America.
213
  
Eisenhower continued his evaluation by saying that Jiang was risking his whole 
position on Formosa for “militarily weak” offshore positions. “All of these risks and 
disadvantages exist because of the calculation that for us to persuade Chiang to adopt any 
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other plan would result in a collapse of morale on Formosa and the loss to the free world 
of that bastion of strength. In other words, the principal military reason for holding these 
two groups of islands is the estimated effect of their loss upon morale in Formosa.” If the 
US gave up on the Nationalist-held islands, it would have a poor effect on other Asian 
countries and it would detrimentally affect their morale. If, however, Jiang decided on his 
own to retreat from the coastal defenses, it would be good for everyone. The question that 
faced America was how the US could accomplish this.
214
  
Eisenhower believed that the best way to de-emphasize the offshore islands was 
not to abandon them, but make it known that the neither the ROC nor the US would 
commit to their “full-out defense.” That way, any result from an attack would not 
necessarily damage America’s position in the region. Eisenhower was beginning to doubt 
much of Jiang’s bluster in regards to the coastal fortifications and said that he did not 
believe “the sincerity of Chiang’s contention that the retention or loss of the offshore 
islands would spell the difference between a strong and a destroyed Nationalist 
government on Formosa. If this is so, his own headquarters should be on the offshore 
islands.” The US would need to convince the Generalissimo that he should change his 
troop deployments and begin to see the offshore islands as outposts only. Formosa should 
assist in the defense of the offshore islands, and plan for a defense that would exact heavy 
losses on the PLA before retreating. The US for its part needed to increase military 
support on Formosa, in part, to help with taking advantage of a future situation in which 
Chiang could invade and retake mainland China. Finally, these changes should be viewed 





The White House began a push to implement this new strategy in mid-April. The 
president directed US military and diplomatic personnel on Formosa to get Jiang to 
propose a solution for the offshore islands. The administration wanted the ROC to pull 
back from Quemoy and Matsu and in return the US would increase its forces on Formosa. 
American officials, however, should not force Jiang’s hand. America “should lead the 
Generalissimo into making a proposition that will neither commit the United States to 
war in defense of the controversial positions nor will constitute an implied repudiation of 
the Generalissimo by this government.”
216
 The president desperately wanted Jiang to 
minimize the offshore islands in its defensive arrangements. Eisenhower had come to the 
conclusion that the US could not go to war over them because American public opinion 




On April 25, 1955 the administration received word from Taipei that 
Eisenhower’s new strategy had collapsed. Representing the US in meetings with Jiang 
and his staff was Admiral Radford, Ambassador Carl Rankin, Assistant Secretary of 
Staten Robertson and Rear Admiral George W. Anderson Jr., the last of which was 
serving as Special Assistant to Radford.
218
   The US delegation told Jiang that America 
would not go to war over Quemoy and Matsu, mostly because of world opinion, and 
would commit only to defend Formosa. If a war with USSR ever came about, the US 
would need bases around the world and other countries would not support the 
administration if a war started over the offshore islands. The president had decided that 
the US and ROC must accept a Communist buildup of forces across from Quemoy and 
Matsu and could not initiate a war over this issue. If, however, Jiang would withdraw 
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from the coastal positions, the US would help in interdiction efforts in the sea lanes off 
the mainland as a substitute for an offshore islands defense.
219
  
Jiang said that he would abide by the MDT and signing statements, especially 
with regards to his pledge to not take any military actions without US consent. However, 
he refused the US proposal to evacuate Quemoy and Matsu. Jiang declared that the ROC 
would defend the positions with or without American help. He continued by saying that if 
he abandoned the coastal strongholds, his government would lose domestic support. Jiang 
asked if Eisenhower had changed his mind in regards to Quemoy and Matsu and Radford 
responded by saying the president, despite his January 31 message to Jiang, could not 
protect those islands, because to do so would mean the use of atomic weapons. If that 
occurred then the world would disapprove and the possible huge loss of civilian life as a 
result needed to be considered.  Radford assured the Generalissimo that Eisenhower had 
not come to this decision lightly. Jiang asked if Eisenhower understood what this 
proposal would do to confidence in Asia. Yeh, present at the meeting on the ROC side, 
asked if atomic weapons were absolutely necessary for a defense and Radford said yes. 
Jiang was visibly upset at what he perceived as the president’s backtracking on what the 




After a brief adjournment Jiang returned to the meeting telling his American allies 
that the PRC would not attack the offshore islands for their own sake, but would do so as 
a prelude to an assault on Taiwan. He also stated that the PRC was not going to attack the 
disputed territory any time soon. Jiang believed Mao would not launch any military 
operations against Quemoy and Matsu without a green light from the USSR and the 
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Soviets would not give that go ahead yet because they were not ready for a world war. 
Jiang informed the US delegation that he was turning down Eisenhower’s proposal.
221
 
Robertson attempted to clear the air about Eisenhower’s previous commitment to defend 
Quemoy and Matsu saying that the US had the right to withdraw from this private 
assurance to defend the offshore islands at any time and should expect there would be no 
bad feelings from the KMT. This was, in the end, a US prerogative. Robertson cited a 
changing US and world opinion as the reason the alteration had occurred at that time. 
This explanation did not assuage Jiang and after the leader of Nationalist China excused 




Eisenhower, upon learning of the particulars and result of the meetings in Taipei, 
was understandably disappointed. The president was more upset at the perceived 
deficiencies in the American delegations delivery than in Jiang’s decision. In fact 
Eisenhower told Dulles that after reading the accounts of the meeting, that he would have 
done the same thing as Jiang. Eisenhower commented that Radford and Robertson simply 
did “not grasp the concept” that he, the president, was trying to accomplish. The end 
result of the meeting was too blunt of an offer and was not carried out with the tact 
Eisenhower had envisioned.
223
 Eisenhower’s disappointment and rather harsh critique of 
Radford and Robertson in the aftermath of the Taipei meeting was unfair at best. The 
president’s expectations were wildly unrealistic. There was no possibility of any 
American talking Jiang into reducing his forces on Quemoy let alone removing them and 
then convincing a shrewd politician like Jieshi that he had come up with the idea himself 
in the first place. Eisenhower’s latest ad hoc plan was doomed from the beginning. That 
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he convinced grown men to travel half way around the world and attempt it was 
impressive in its own right. 
Eisenhower, in April, laid out the difficulties of the Taiwan Straits and what his 
administration’s policy would become for the remainder of the crisis. Eisenhower said 
that the defense treaty with the ROC did not require the United States to protect the 
offshore island but, because of circumstances, the Republic of China could expect the 
United States to safeguard Matsu and Quemoy. He put on paper that foreign and 
American domestic opinion was against the United States on the issue of fighting for the 
contentious territory. The international community believed these controversial positions 
belonged to the mainland and Eisenhower believed that US involvement in their defense 




However, Eisenhower made the case that, by not protecting the islands, great 
dangers arose as well. If the United States backed down in the Taiwan Straits, the morale 
of the Nationalist military would be damaged and the rest of Asia could fall to 
communism. The two choices of defend or not were “two unacceptable choices” and the 
president’s administration had to find a third option. The world agreed with the United 




Eisenhower pointed out the various obstacles of defending the Quemoy and 
Matsu groups by saying the use of atomic weapons would have to be used to adequately 
protect the positions, and this use would have a disastrous effect on world opinion of the 
Unites States. Domestic opinion would suffer as well and with the combination of the 
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two, the US would be at a severe disadvantage if a general war broke out with the PRC. If 
American honor were attached too strongly to the islands close to the mainland, this 
would endanger the other regional allies and commitments of the United States 
government. Eisenhower summed up the commitment to the offshore area, as “the 
principle military reason for holding these two groups of islands is the estimated effect of 
their loss upon the morale in Formosa.”
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The president described the “psychological effect” on Asian countries in the 
region if the United States did not defend the islands and this danger would lie in 
opposition to any benefit America would receive for not fighting for them. Eisenhower 
hoped that Jiang would remove his government and the president’s from staking their 
collective national pride on the controversial territories and reposition the Nationalist 
forces to concentrated locations on Formosa and the Pescadores. The president hoped that 
such a move would be seen by Asia as a wise decision. The administration’s overall goal 
was to fulfill America’s obligation under the defense treaty, keep domestic and world 
opinion on the Administration’s side, keep the morale of the Nationalists high and keep 
Asian countries allied to America during the Cold War. The third option for the 
administration was America and Formosa to announce that Quemoy and Matsu would not 
be protected all out nor abandoned. The islands should be considered outposts and 
supplied and secured such.
227
 
The failure of the administration to successfully convince Jiang to voluntarily 
abandon the remaining offshore islands had little short term consequences. Eisenhower’s 
less than clever plan was upstaged by PRC Premier Zhou Enlai at the Bandung, Indonesia 
conference of Asian and African states from April 18-24, 1955.  
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Dulles wrote to Eisenhower to inform him that Zhou Enlai told the Bandung 
conference that the PRC was ready to discuss the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful 
means. Dulles described this stunning turn of events as “significant.” Although Dulles 
had his reservations stating that Mao’s government might be trying to separate the 
offshore islands and Taiwan so they could attack the former without US intervention, the 




The result of this statement, and American willingness to talk, resulted in the 
inauguration of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Geneva on August 1, 1955.
229
   
Beijing genuinely hoped the talks would produce tangible results in their relations with 
America.  The main purpose of the talks was to deal with the issue of Taiwan; however, 
the PRC also wanted an end to an American economic embargo, gain official diplomatic 
recognition by Washington and admittance into the United Nations as the sole 
representative of the Chinese people.  The United States was only interested in recovering 
American citizens held by the PRC and forcing Mao to renounce the use of force in the 
Taiwan Straits.
230
   Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed anti-Communist forces 
and governments in Asia would weaken if America caved on issues like recognition, 
trade or cultural exchanges.
231
 After China agreed to the release of Americans, the talks 
deadlocked when neither side was willing to agree to the others’ proposals.
232
 
The United States demanded that the PRC renounce the use of force in the straits 
before any other substantive issues could be discussed.
233
  This precondition essentially 
ended the talks.   In 1957, after two years of stalled negotiations, Walter S. Robertson, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, suggested to Dulles that the 
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ambassadorial talks be downgraded because the United States could not convince the 
PRC to renounce military action in the Taiwan area, and therefore no further success in 
the talks was possible.
234
  The ambassadorial talks from September 1955 to the end of 
1957 became stalling tactics for both sides.
235
  During this nearly three-year period, the 
United States and ROC took the opportunity to increase their military interdependence in 
the straits and make important military decisions that would agitate Beijing, culminating 
in the 1958 shelling of Quemoy. 
Jiang realized that the United States was reluctant to go to war over the offshore 
islands in 1954 and 1955 and decided to increase ROC troop strength on Quemoy and 
Matsu, hoping to tie America to the islands.  Jiang increased his military forces on 
Quemoy from 30,000 at the time of the MDT signing to 90,000 by August 1958 and put 
10,000 men on Matsu by 1958.   Jiang concentrated one third of his entire military on two 
small islands off the coast of mainland China.
236
  In April of 1955, the United States 
counseled against this personnel buildup on the islands, but did nothing substantive to 
stop it.  Later, during the 1958 crisis both Eisenhower and Dulles lamented the fact that 
so much of Taiwan’s prestige was wrapped up in the offshore islands because of this 
buildup and declared the move “extremely foolish” and “utterly mad.”
237
 
The United States used the inter-crisis years to build up its own military forces in 
the area.  America constructed a huge $25 million B-52 ready air base on Taiwan and 
also shipped Matador surface to surface tactical nuclear missiles to the island that had a 
range of 600-650 miles.
238
 Zhou Enlai called these moves part of a plan “to turn Taiwan 
into a nuclear base against China.”
239
  By March 1958, the U.S. and ROC had combined 
their respective military operations in the Taiwan area under the U.S.-Taiwan Defense 
 93 
Assistance Command, which grouped the formerly separate Taiwan Defense Command 
and the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG).
240
  In the spring of 1958, joint 
exercises were conducted in Taiwan with the use of Matador missiles.
241
  The ROC 
conducted sabotage and propaganda leaflet dropping missions along the China coast, as 
well as air reconnaissance missions that resulted in frequent air battles between the PRC 
and ROC.
242
  The unmistakable message to Beijing was that America was in Taiwan to 
stay.  
Scholars debate the reasons why Mao decided to shell Quemoy again in August of 
1958.  Some academics claim the decision was prompted by Mao’s desire to bring 
America back to the negotiating table in Geneva under the auspices of the ambassadorial 
talks.  Others claim the reason was for domestic political consumption during Mao’s 
Great Leap Forward.  Still others claim Mao wanted to show support for Arabs in 
Lebanon when Eisenhower decided to intervene diplomatically and militarily in July 
1958.  Fear of Jiang’s movements in the Taiwan straits also contributes heavily to the 
thinking of Mao in the summer of 1958.
243
  Regardless of why Mao started shelling 
Quemoy in 1958, the fact that America had failed to deal with the offshore issue 
effectively in the 1954 MDT, and subsequent continued crisis in 1955, left Mao an easily 
accessible target that could gain him international attention and put pressure on the 
Eisenhower administration. 
The United States only included Taiwan, and the nearby southwestern island 
chain called the Pescadores, within the treaty area of the MDT in 1954.  The only 
provision for Quemoy and the other ROC held offshore islands came in article VI of the 
treaty, which stated the defense area would also include “such other territories as may be 
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determined by mutual agreement.”
244
  This language was designed by the United States to 
ensure the Eisenhower administration did not commit to the defense of the offshore 
islands and keep Mao guessing as to American plans for those islands not covered in the 
MDT.
245
  This policy backfired after the signing of the MDT when Mao authorized the 
invasion of the ROC controlled Dachen islands off the Zhejiang Province coast in 
December 1954 and January 1955. The result was the Formosa Resolution and the 
Eisenhower administration helping to completely evacuate all ROC forces from the 
Dachen’s.
246
  The status of the remaining offshore islands continued in limbo through the 
ambassadorial talks.  With the breakdown of the Geneva talks in 1958, Mao once again 
could turn to Quemoy as an outlet for his displeasure with both Taipei and Washington. 
In the weeks leading up to the shelling of Quemoy, the Eisenhower administration 
was seeing signals that a crisis was looming and tried once again to make a decision on 
how to handle the offshore island issue.  Everett F. Drumright, U.S. ambassador to 
Taiwan, informed Washington that tensions in the straits were rising on July 30, 1958, 
and there was intelligence that the PRC military, the PLA, was moving aircraft from 
Manchuria and Southeast China to positions opposite Taiwan.
247
  A few days later, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff  responded to Drumright’s alarm by stating there was no evidence 
that the PLA was preparing for offensive actions in the area.
248
 Drumright turned out to 
be correct, Mao had ordered the shelling on July 17 and jet fighters were redeploying in 
the area as Drumright was writing the State Department.
249
 Washington’s ignorance of 
the situation in Asia only lasted a week after Drumright’s first warning and by August 7, 
both the military and the CIA were cognizant of the rising tensions and the movement of 
PLA planes in the vicinity of Taiwan.
250
 The next day Walter S. Robertson, predicted the 
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PRC would probably attempt to blockade Quemoy in an attempt to secure another round 
of negotiations with the United States.
251
  The question in early August 1958 for the 
Eisenhower administration was how would they treat the offshore islands if conflict did 
occur?     
In 1954, Eisenhower had decided not to defend the offshore islands, but on 
August, 12 1958, Dulles tried to convince Eisenhower that an attack on the offshore 
islands was an attack on Taiwan and that the situation in the area had changed 
dramatically since 1954 and 1955.
252
  President Eisenhower initially argued that the 
islands had no strategic value, but Dulles prevailed in convincing the president that they 
did have important psychological and morale value for the ROC and America should 
issue a statement linking the islands to Taiwan.
253
  The most important change in the 
situation for the administration was that in 1958 Quemoy and Matsu had 100,000 troops 
stationed on them.
254
 As tensions rose, Jiang began insisting that America declare that an 
attack on Quemoy was an attack on Taiwan.
255
 On August 20, 1958, Robertson tried to 
push Dulles and Eisenhower into making a decision on whether the US would defend the 
offshore islands “under any circumstance,” and made the argument that America should, 
but not go public with the decision.
256
 
Hours before the beginning of the Quemoy shelling, Dulles sent a letter to the 
chairman of the house foreign affairs committee stating that the offshore islands were 
integral to the defense of Taiwan and then ordered the note leaked to the press.
257
  As 
soon as his brother Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, informed the secretary of state that the 
PLA had opened fire on Quemoy, John Foster Dulles immediately backtracked on his 
conviction that Quemoy was vital to American interests.  He stated that America was not 
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in a defensible position in the court of public opinion if they argued Beijing could not 
attack Quemoy knowing “this area is used by the Chinats as an active base for attempting 
to foment civil strife and to carry out widespread propaganda through leaflets…” Dulles 
continued by saying the United States was asking the world to accept the offshore islands 
as a “privileged sanctuary” that the ROC could use to wage war against the PRC while 
Beijing could only stand and watch.  The secretary also made the point that the western 
powers had stopped dropping propaganda leaflets in Eastern Europe.  Dulles finished 
with presenting the possibility of taking the new crisis to the United Nations just as they 
had contemplated in 1954.
258
 
Despite Dulles’ wavering, the administration was moving closer to defending the 
offshore islands.  Eisenhower said that the offshore islands would probably have to be 
protected “for one reason and one alone, namely, to sustain the morale…” of the ROC.  
Eisenhower also decided that the time had not come to name publicly which islands 
would be protected and which would not.
259
  On August 24, with the shelling well on its 
way, Jiang asked again if Quemoy and Matsu could be included in the MDT.  
Ambassador Drumright responded that any change would have to be approved by the 
United States Senate.
260
  While the Eisenhower administration debated how far it was 
willing to go in defending Quemoy, the exchange of notes, accompanying the MDT in 
1954, was acting as a buffer keeping the crisis from spinning out of control. 
In November 1954, while the MDT was being negotiated, the ROC launched an 
air raid on Mainland China without prior American approval.
261
 As a result of the 
November raid, Dulles proposed a protocol to the MDT formalizing an agreement that 
the ROC would consult with the United States before any military action was taken by 
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Taiwan.  The purpose of this arrangement was to ensure that America would not have any 
treaty obligations forced on the United States as a result of ROC offensive actions against 
the PRC.  Dulles was unable to convince Taiwan to include this new provision within the 
text of the treaty, but did succeed in having the protocol agreed to in an exchange of notes 
after the signing of the MDT.
262
 This exchange of notes played an important part in how 
the 1958 crisis unfolded. 
Once the shelling of Quemoy began on August 22, 1958, Jiang did not retaliate 
against the PRC beyond what the United States had approved.  Drumright wrote back to 
Washington extolling the patience and “restraint” Jiang showed in not conducting any 
military operations not approved of by America beforehand.  Drumright continued by 
saying that he believed that the ROC would continue to consult with the United States 
even in the face of mounting casualties on Quemoy.
263
  On August 31, Jiang became 
upset that the U.S. would not attack PRC airfields and complained that Taiwan’s’ right of 
self-defense was being abridged.  Despite Jiang’s frustration, he continued to make it 
clear that he would do nothing without consulting with Washington first.
264
  On 
September 4, the U.S. military responded to a request from the ROC asking for 
permission to launch air strikes against mainland targets by citing the exchange of notes 
on December 10, 1954 and refusing the request.
265
  Even the White House was amazed at 
Jiang’s restraint.  The president noted that the ROC air force was not attacking PRC junks 
in the Amoy harbor, even though they had the right to under the terms of the exchange of 
notes.
266
 As long as Jiang acceded to the exchange of notes, this assured that only the 
People’s Republic of China would remain as the sole unpredictable actor that Eisenhower 
would have to account for while managing the crisis. 
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That is if you do not count the United States military.  The Eisenhower 
administration, with Dulles in the lead, developed a new worldwide defense strategy 
called, alternately, the ‘New Look’ or ‘Massive Retaliation.’  The purpose of the New 
Look policy was to use strategic nuclear forces to deter, and possibly respond, to hostile 
action from Communist states.  If an enemy believed the United States would strike back 
with dozens or conceivably hundreds of nuclear weapons against any provocation, then 
perhaps the enemy would not make an armed move against the western allies.  The most 
appealing aspect of this doctrine was that America could contain communism in Europe 
and Asia with minimal use of conventional military forces, and minimal cost to the US 
taxpayer.
267
  Eisenhower was saddled with this Massive Retaliation strategy as the second 
Taiwan Straits crisis began. 
During the week leading up to the shelling of Quemoy, as evidence was mounting 
that Mao was positioning the PLA for an offensive move, the JCS was already telling the 
president that “U.S. intervention would necessitate nuclear bombing of mainland 
bases.”
268
 The JCS throughout the crisis attempted to convince Eisenhower to delegate 
operational responses to the field commanders, including the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons.  Fortunately, Eisenhower ordered that authority over all nuclear weapons would 
remain with him as commander in chief.
269
 Eisenhower retained control over the nation’s 
nuclear arsenal, but because of the New Look policy, the military began moving massive 
nuclear forces into the area.  The JCS ordered the Pacific fleet to prepare for nuclear 
attack against PLA coastal air bases and sorties deep into China.  A B-47 nuclear attack 
squadron on Guam, containing fifteen bombers, was made available to attack the PRC.
270
  
On September 2, Chairman of the JCS, General Nathan F. Twining, continued to insist 
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that if the United States began military operations, atomic weapons would have to be 
used.  Twining made the case that small tactical nuclear weapons were the only option 
“to do the job.”  The great fear among many of the JCS staff was another long, hellish, 
protracted war like Korea.
271
 One other justification for the use of nuclear weapons was 
the realization that the communist bloc had vast resources of men that America simply 
did not have.
272
   
With nuclear control squarely in Eisenhower’s hands, Jiang in a strait jacket and 
the PLA only shelling Quemoy; the president could waffle for the time being on Quemoy 
and decided to begin a program of escorting shipments of supplies to the beleaguered 
island.  Eisenhower decided to restrict convoys to international waters and only offer 
material support to the ROC.
273
  On September 7, the American navy began escorting 
ROC supply ships to Quemoy.  Although the first attempt was successful, subsequent 
attempts failed under the withering fire of PLA guns.  This forced both Taipei and 
Washington to change tactics.  The ROC started using Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVTs) 
amphibious vehicles to bring supplies directly from the sea onto the beaches of Quemoy 
and this along with the ROC fighter jets being outfitted with air-to-air sidewinder 
missiles, helped break the artillery blockade of Quemoy.
274
  General Twining reported to 
the president on 30 September that the siege was “broken.”
275
 
Before the conclusion of the Quemoy resupply problem, the president went on 
national television to address America and the world on the crisis in the straits.  The 
President told the audience that America was prepared to defend Quemoy for the first 
time.  However, behind the scenes Eisenhower told Dulles that he was ready to abandon 
Quemoy, but not ready to say this publicly.
276
  After nearly a decade of not being clear on 
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the United States’ position on the offshore islands and as a result causing two major 
international incidents with the People’s Republic of China, Eisenhower made a public 
statement on defending Quemoy, while privately determining to let the island go to the 
Communists in the middle of the most tense moments of the 1958 crisis. The public’s 
response to Eisenhower’s address was one of shock and disapproval.  Sixty two percent 
of the eighty percent of Americans who were following the crisis Gallup polled did not 
want to go to war over the offshore islands. Eighty two percent wanted the United States 
to go to the UN before taking military action and 470 out of 640 letters to the White 
House wanted America to stay out of the conflict.
277
   
With public support negligible for the administration’s policy and the resupply 
crises eased, Dulles decided to take up a PRC offer to resume the ambassadorial talks 
only in Warsaw instead of Geneva on September, 15 1958.
278
 On October 6, Mao gave 
the order for a six day ceasefire after realizing the blockade had failed and was not 
willing to push the United States any further in the crisis.
279
  The crisis gradually cooled 
down, as both sides were not willing to go to war over the offshore islands. 
The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, because it left the offshore islands out of the 
defensive perimeter, left Mao Zedong a convenient place on the map to test American 
resolve and further his own domestic and international policies.  If Dulles and 
Eisenhower had either decided to include the offshore islands in the treaty or abandon 
them in 1954, Mao would not have had the opportunity to start a conflict that threatened 
world peace in 1954-5 and again in 1958.  The exchange of notes accompanying the 
signing of the MDT in 1954 did have a mollifying effect on the 1958 crisis once it began.  
Because Jiang was reliant on American support for his defense, Jiang abided by the notes 
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and did not make any major military moves against the PRC that might have expanded 
the conflict.  The notes gave Eisenhower the ability to manage the crisis and avoid going 
to war over Quemoy as long as the PRC restricted itself to only shelling the island and 
not making an amphibious assault or conducting an air bombing campaign. 
Because the MDT failed to thwart the PRC, Dulles and Eisenhower decided on 
January 19, 1955 to go before Congress and ask for a resolution giving the president 
special war powers to protect Taiwan and, if need be, the remaining offshore islands. The 
Dachen campaign led to a sweeping Congressional resolution that passed nearly 
unanimously in both the House and Senate, and gave broad powers to the president by 
January 28, 1955.
280
 The furor over Beijing’s military move led also to the quick and 
overwhelming passage of the Mutual Defense Treaty by the Senate on February 9, 
1955.
281
 A casualty of these furious moves on both sides of the Pacific was the shelving 
of the UN Oracle plan on February 14, 1955.
282
 
Oracle was already falling apart of its own weight by February 1955.  There were 
indications that the PRC, with Soviet help, would do everything it could to defeat the 
proposal despite the fact that it did not have a seat in the United Nations. The ROC was 
firmly against the proposal as well, despite getting its defense treaty with the US. 
Ironically, both Chinese governments opposed Oracle for the same reason.  They felt that 
a UN enforced cease-fire would freeze into place the idea of two China’s, something 
neither side was prepared to accept. New Zealand and Great Britain wanted to drop 
Oracle because they felt a veto in the security council would damage their reputations as 
well as the strength of the UN. Although Dulles did, behind closed doors, continue to 
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lobby for the resolution, Zhou Enlai’s rapprochement at the Bandung, Indonesia 
conference ended the need for Dulles to pursue Oracle any further.
283
 
The Eisenhower administration spent the better part of a year from the fall of 
1954 to the summer of 1955 wavering back and forth between making a public 
declaration that they would defend the offshore islands and, conversely, attempting to 
find an alternative to any public support. In the MDT, Dulles attempted to “fuzz up” the 
language surrounding Quemoy, Matsu, and the Dachens in the hope of confusing the 
PRC as to what the US would do if they were attacked. When this failed, and the PRC 
began its Dachen campaign, Eisenhower flirted with the idea of telling the world America 
would guard the offshore islands along with Formosa. After a strong push back from the 
British, Eisenhower abandoned this idea, however he did give a private assurance to 
Jiang that this was the US policy. Eisenhower next attempted to convince Jiang to either 
withdraw or severely diminish ROC troop levels on Quemoy and Matsu to devalue the 
controversial islands morale value, and strangely, do so in a way in which Jiang would 
believe he came up with the idea. When Jiang refused this alternative, Eisenhower and 
Dulles had no alternative but to wait and hope the PRC was not willing to go to war with 
America over the offshore islands. Luckily, the PRC did not and Zhou Enlai offered a 
negotiated solution to the crisis at the Bandung Conference in April 1955. 
Dulles came into the Eisenhower administration with a clear idea of how to 
conduct foreign policy. The new secretary of state believed in clarity of design and 
purpose. If America was straight forward in what it wanted and what it would and would 
not do, then miscalculation by the enemy, in this case worldwide Communism, would be 
negated. The best way to avoid a big war in the calculation of Dulles was to avoid 
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misunderstandings between nations. Unfortunately, the dynamics of the Cold War and 
the realities of the offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits kept Dulles from implementing 
what should have been a rational, even successful policy. Because the KMT government 
on Taiwan was wrapping up so much of its prestige into holding all of the territory it still 
controlled, the US believed it could not allow the offshore islands to fall and result in 
catastrophic consequences for the morale of the Nationalist military and destabilize 
Jiang’s government. If Taiwan fell to the Communists as a result, then it would serve as 
the first domino of western leaning democracies to crumble. Southeast Asia, Japan, and 
the Philippines could be next and America would be endanger of losing the Cold War 
altogether. However, American allies like Great Britain would not support a war over the 
offshore islands and American public opinion was decidedly against another conflict in 
Asia so soon after the conclusion of the deeply unpopular Korean War. The Eisenhower 
administration had painted itself into an ideological corner that created longstanding 
tensions and crisis after crisis all because it could not make a clear decision on the status 
of Quemoy, Matsu, and the other ROC holdings along the mainland Chinese coast.
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